The Return of Zero Sum International Conflict
During the Cold War, the Russians pursued an International Relations theory that essentially simplified their international relations gaming to highly rational, immediately focused equation where harm to Western allies was a gain for Russia and harm to the Soviet Union was a loss. Such zero sum gaming is a very slippery slope and resulted in not only the Cuban Missile crisis but also a large number of proxy conflicts that cost many lives and extensive financial resources. Differences over Syria and Ukraine have decayed relations and risk dragging the world into a new era of zero sum decision making. The Saudi Arabia lead Sunni States and Iran lead Shi'ite States have already transcended into a regional zero sum conflict. Zero Sum conflicts are of course unnecessary and counter-productive, there are almost always mutually beneficial deals to be made, but level headed liberal optimism is not always the surest route to survival, especially when your competitor is aggressively making zero-sum based decisions and doing so with competently trained proxies, crates of AK47s, high-tech ground to air missile systems, nuclear reactors and operational training from seasoned vets in covert action.
The new cold war started quietly in the Ivory Coast, when Russian backed president Laurent Gbagdo, clung to power after losing the 2011 election to Alassane Quattra. Russian companies enjoyed a range of mineral and fossil fuel contracts from which they were benefiting from, and Russian intelligence determined that they could maintain hold on the West African coastal country with a minimal flex of muscle and some sly psy-ops claiming a false electoral victory. The International community cried foul, however, and with UN resolutions the French military, presumably the French Foreign Legion, helped secure the transition of power. With the Arab Spring in full swing and domestic politics somewhat supportive of the Arab uprising thanks to the world media's presentation of the protests as simple peaceful protest against tyranny with sparsely little commentary on the economic and security implications for the respective populations. Russia and China both voted to authorize action against Gaddafi and the pace of history was stomping at a double march. While the dominos were allowed to fall from Tunisia, through Libya to Egypt, uprisings outside of North Africa were largely suppressed. The Administration wisely said very little about the uprisings in the Arabian Peninsula and the more competent regimes, capable of achieving an astute balance between affluent generosity and vicious punishment were able to withstand Shi'ite uprisings, that were at least in part, funded, directed and encouraged by Iran.
Syria, reciprocally, was seen as Iran's closest ally, a conduit of arms and cash to Hezbollah and Lebanon, and an obstacle to deterring Iran's nuclear ambitions. While the early protests were internally promoted by Syrian professors and early uprisings a response to Assad's forces firing a few fatal shots, it was not long before a propagandized push for sympathy comparable to that coordinated by Sam Adams when he dubbed, "Boston Masacre," created outrage amongst civilians and provided the impetus for the spectrum of international players to enter into the foray. The Syrian government lacked the cash to buy peace, but possessed a far more competent and larger military than Libya, holding a far more advanced air to missile defense system discouraging wider Western intervention. Bashar Assad, even as he was a member of a relatively small minority religious sect and ethnic group, also had one other major strategic advantage: he was host to Russia's only naval port in the Mediterranean. Seeing how the regime changes in Libya and the Ivory Coast caused contracts to swing from Russia to the West, Vladimir Putin clearly saw his interest in Syria. Bashar Assad had long been a client state of Russian Weapons and with a pesky insurgency and civil war that could potentially end with the annihilation of the alawites he would have an even better client. For the West and our cooperating partners on the Arabian Peninsula, the Syrian conflict became a means of ratcheting up pressure on Iran to come to the table for a nuclear deal. With Turkish and Qatari intel, along with a range of Western donors loosening the purse strings on funds supporting the rebels, a flood of aspiring jihadis surged into the region. While some were moderates looking for democracy and an end to the heavy repressive measures of the Bashar Assad regime, many were Islamists vulnerable to recruitment by the battle hardened veterans of the Iraqi insurgency centered around Al-Qaeda in Iraq, transforming and rebranding itself into the fighting forces of the Islamic State. With luke warm and weary support from the West, the moderate UN supported reforming forces of the Free Syrian Army became increasingly in competition with radical insurgents of the Islamic State and Al-Nursa, who gradually pulled more and more fighters from the ranks of the Free Syrian Army as Western support waned and hard fighting and an intense civil war fought largely along Sunni/non-Sunni lines of division made the Islamic State the dominant force in opposition to Damascus and Baghdad.
In Ukraine, the populace in Kiev had made the determination to part from its historical political ties to Russia and move closer to the European Union. Russia had promised high costs for such actions and when the Russian backed government fell, Russian made sure those high costs were extracted in the form of economic and physical pain. Natural Gas Prices were the easiest way to inflict costs and back debts became the first punishing price. Crimea, a former gift to Ukraine from Russia when it joined the Soviet Union, held Russia's only warm water naval port on the black sea and it was the first victim of direct Russian action as commandos in military uniforms void of indentifying insignia, eerily equipped with unloaded AK47s with magazines of ammo removed from the clip, but in hand, stormed the airport, mayor's offices and police stations in the early morning. The mirky force with its non-lethal pose, and uncertainty as to who these commandos were working for allowed them to take the symbolic seats of power without firing a shot. Elections were quickly held to approve a referendum for Crimea's repatriation with Russia, and the Duma accepted them back with much chest pounding bravado and an awakened Russian machoism not seen since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Ethnic Russians in the East of Ukraine followed suit, but the professionalism witnessed in the Crimea operations were lacking in Donetsk, where what has been described as an unruly mob of ethnic Russians has terrorized the countryside, using weapons believed to be supplied by Russia to wage military assaults on the representatives of the elected government of Kiev and sympathetic civilians alike, including shooting down a civilian passenger jet. Ukraine was better prepared to respond to rebels in the East but their equipment is largely out of date, with fighting resulting in vacillating cease fires and light artillery conflicts that have the ominous potential of erupting into something less zero sum and more sum of all fears related. While Russia has significantly increased its harassment of US and UK airspace, flying bombers to the edge of US and UK airspace, and has popped up submarines off the San Diego Coast and in Scandinavian harbors, the probability of direct Russian assault approaches zero so long as nuclear deterrent threats remain credible and so it is only in contested space that armed conflicts emerge between proxy forces.
In the early fighting, Bashar Assad focused his efforts on the Free Syrian Army while continuing to buy oil from ISIS held territories within Syria. Opposing ISIS during it's early successes was an uneasy prospect in Sunni dominated countries where it evokes emotional sympathy. Abu Bakr's clever tactics, however, were outsized by his strategic shortfalls. The US and company may have been quit content to allow ISIS to continue pressuring Assad in Syria and pushing to improve the Sunni/Shi'ite balance in Iraq, but acts of genocide in Sinjar prompted US intervention and now made the US not only a rhetorical enemy of the Islamic State, but a menace dropping bombs from above.
It was becoming increasingly clear that the flames of war sparked to harass regional rivals had become inflamed by radical acts of terrorism and were now threatening to envelop and consume the entire region, allies, cooperating partners, competitors, enemies and all. The extensive terrorist propaganda proliferating from the Islamic State pushed emotional buttons and stabbed at the heart of Western Sentiments, political demands for action mounted and our military was soon waging war against a proxy our intelligence agency had at least a small hand in cultivating. As Sunni Countries cautiously put skin in the game along with a growing list of Western, and even Eastern partners and allies, the popularity of the Islamic State, at least as is and under its current leadership, has waned significantly. The battle ground successes, however, have unfortunately often come at the hands of radical shi'ite militias, arguably even more contrarian to US regional interests, and certainly thus far, there has been no meaningful efforts at a political solution and no clear end to fighting in sight.
In Syria, after the immolation of a captured Jordanian pilot, their forces have taken an increasingly aggressive role in the fighting and have received additional financial aid and support from the USA. The Jordanians are among the more highly trained militaries in the region and have a long history of security related cooperation with the West. Jordan has also been among the most directly affected by fighting in Syria, as literally millions of Syrians have fled to Jordan as refugees. King Abdullah Hussein has the appropriate pedigree for Caliphate and has pushed to improve the treatment of woman, including banning honor killings. With the support of the West and other Arab League governments Jordan is in the strongest position to take bring the fighting to acceptable conclusion, where Sunni Arabs are afforded more autonomy within the governates in Syria, where they have long been an oppressed majority.
The Pesh Merga, the Kurdish militia based out of Northern Iraq, has been the United States primary coordinating ally as it relates to fighting on the ground on the Iraqi side of the border. Mobilizing nearly the entirety of their society for the fight, the Pesh Merga have been able to retake crucial damns, hold Irbil, relieve pressure from the Yezhidi's previously trapped on Mount Sinjar, retake portions of Mosul, and work with Turkish and Syrian Kurdish fighting forces to retake the cit of Kobani from ISIL forces. The Pesh Merga have been valued allies of the United States; however, the provision of arms by the west complicates hopes of Iraqi unity and relations with NATO partner Turkey, who long fought the related Kurdish socialist militant group, the PKK. There is a long-standing fear amongst the Turks that if the Kurds break away from Iraq, they will take the Kurdish dominated eastern portions of Turkey with them. Realistically, the confederation of Iraq may be the only long-term stabilizing solution, and improving relations between the Sunni Government in Istanbul and the Kurds of both Turkey and Iraq could work to preserve the integrity of Turkey's borders while expanding its sphere of influence. The Iraqi military under its new Unity government has improved meritocracy within its ranks after the harmful shuffles made by former Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Malaki contributed to the rise of ISIS, but the Unity Government response to ISIS has also brought about the arming and deployment of radical Shi'ite militias advancing Iranian regional influence capable of undermining reconciliation between Anbar Province and Baghdad. While ISIS is slowly being pushed back militarily, little has been done to improve the likely hood of a permanent political solution that could improve the quality of life and standards of living that are the root cause of such violence. Air campaigns with limited troops on the ground tend to be messy and bring the population towards the targeted group out of sympathy and need for protection. ISIS became popular because the Shi'ite dominated Iraqi and Syrian governments are brutally oppressive in their dealings with their respective, significant Sunni populations; therefore, increased autonomy and supplanting ISIS leadership with reconciliatory reformers is the only path to peace. Promoting moderate, reforming, reconciliatory voices requires providing them security, something US Marines and Green Berets are uniquely suited to do successfully. If there is one clear failure on the part of Barack Obama and his administration, it has been his unwillingness to commit forces to provide security for moderate political voices within these troubled regions. This is the case in Libya with its parliament, was the case in Iraq with its moderate Shi'ite clerics increasingly brought under the influence of Iran, with the Sunni Tribal leaders instrumental to the Sunni Awakening and for the moderate rebels in Syria fighting both ISIS and the Syrian Army. The only way to empower the moderate voices within Islam is to help provide for their safety so that can speak honestly about the horrid nature of ISIS and its perversion of their faith.
If US allies and cooperating partners continue to define progress as body counts, with developing a clear political and diplomatic strategy in dealing with ISIS, the group will only continue to gain sympathy from dissatisfied populations around the world and continue to pose a graver security threat. ISIS has already branched out into Egypt, Afghanistan and Libya and carries with it the potential to carry increasing influence amongst Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda sympathizers across Africa and South East Asia. The situation in Afghanistan is particularly fragile and while many the Afghani forces have largely fought bravely the US needs to help guide the Afghanis with strategies geared towards preventing the forces of the Taliban from merging with ISIS. Taliban has long been a string for the ISI in Pakistan to pull when convenient and in a country where nationality is abstract concept of little meaning it remains a competitive challenger and increasingly salient political vehicle for Pashtun tribes uninterested in nationalizing forces and mistrustful of outside influences. As relations between the Taliban and Pakistani government fall to all time lows, ISIS positions itself as a potential sponsor for their activities.
The US has increased in support for Ukraine, committing defensive weapons without excluding any options. The Houthi Shi'ites in Yemen are a small minority, but with fighting between Al-Qaeda and the Sunni leadership, the Shi'ites found a seam to take hold of the capitol by military force, using tactics strikingly similar to the tactics used by Ukraine's rebels. While there is succession occurring in Saudi Arabia, the new king may loose patience with the diplomatic process and take action to be sure a Shi'ite lead rival doesn't emerge along its South Western border. While I read one report the US will try to work with the Houthi Shi'ites, I wouldn't on my breath on this one. The way things are shaping up, the security situation is decaying to a zero-sum conflict, with gaming prompted by a defensive Russian intelligence that has shown itself to be increasingly willing to inflict massive harm on regional populations and countries simply to punish violations of their perceived interests. Iran, and its proxies, Hezbollah and Bashar Assad's government are the more visible force, but Russia certainly has the strings and means to reign in Iran and it's Al-Quds if it so chooses. The US, unfortunately has at times, behaved little better, as the "new model of warfare"involving air support for indigenous forces has incurred the consequences of employing unprofessional militias with radical ideological motives under the guise of democratic liberation has lacked either competent follow through or the implementation of a governing strategy capable of bridging the gap between Islam and democracy with profitable peace for advocates of both models. Unfortunately, it seems the apolitical monarchies of the Arab Peninsula focused on stable political and economic environments seem to be the winning model of governance within at least, the Arab portions of the Islamic world. The establishment of a Caliphate, coordinating with the Arab Kings, Sultans and Emirs could actually be the quickest path to regional stability, capable of increasing prosperity and peace, along with volume of trade with Western Countries. Abu Bakr, is obviously the wrong choice of Caliphate, but someone such as King Abdullah Huessein, capable of maintaining peace with Israel and the West, willing to collaborate as it relates to security and the economy, could push back Iranian influence, prevent a regional nuclear arms race and improve relations between NATO and Russia as regional balance and stability becomes more clearly and acceptably established. It's going to be interesting to see if the appointment of an Emir in northern Nigeria will be able to reign in Boko Haram and pacify alienated muslim populations vulnerable to the group's influence. If it works in Nigeria, a similar strategy may need to be employed in Libya and the American people are going to determine, we need less idealists pushing for democracy and more intelligent realists pushing achievable, stabilizing objectives conducive to improving economic performance.
For years, the scholarly fields of history and international relations will look at these events as case studies. In the future we will be asking, how did the tremendous cooperative security environment post 9/11 decay to its current state? They'll look at the importance of credibility in rhetoric, starting with Western commitments not to expand NATO in the deal that brought down the Berlin Wall, but also in Russia's fulfillment of its promise to punish Ukraine's drift toward the EU and Barack Obama's failure to uphold his red-line with Syria and their usage of chemical weapons. We need to be asking now, how can relations and confidence be restored to prevent an onslaught of zero sum gaming potentially resulting in thousands of unnecessary deaths, contracting economies and declines in both world trade and global security?
George Bush and Vladimir Putin held each other with high regards in the early part of his presidency, and there was much optimism towards US/Russian relations. It was with the fifth NATO enlargement into Russian border countries alarms began to ring amongst Russia's Intelligence and military establishment. At the time, the US was too strong and Russia too weak to do much about it, but as America became bogged down in fighting an Iraqi Insurgency and the world was focused on the Beijing Olympics, Vladimir Putin made his calculated move on aspiring NATO participant, Georgia. When Robert Gates left, Barack Obama began to increasingly be perceived as soft, or at least, that was the read on the part of Vladimir Putin and the prompting cause for his bolder actions in Ukraine and in Syria. In the minds of many Russian Security officials, the US had broke its word with the 5th Nato enlargement, but for the US and its new NATO partners, the US was making the necessary moves to ensure that the Soviet Union could never re-emerge, and Russian plans to bring about a new Eurasian trading bloc, have in large part been undermined. Russia has unquestionably felt the hurt as coordinated efforts with Saudi Arabia and a booming American oil and natural gas industry have brought prices for energy way down, weakening Russian leverage over Europe and making their domestic governance unaffordable. Similar pain is being inflicted on Iran. Meanwhile, countries with diverse economies are feeling a jolt of life as lower energy costs lower the costs of business and open room for increased consumer spending. Putin has unquestionably been pushed into a corner, the question is whether he will bark, bite or back down. The chest pounding has strengthened Putin's image domestically and provided for the perfect distraction from a lack-lustre economy slipping into peril. In order to change Russian posture, the West is going to need to change the perception of Putin's actions by the Russian public from a heroic defense of ethnic Russians and defense against Western imperialism to brash and egotistically driven maneuvering endangering global security and severely hurting Russia's economy. For V. Putin's cronies, Russia needs to feel important, and Special and Covert Operations is a realm where it can continue to exert disproportional influence, even if the gains can only be zero sum and carry with them grave repercussions.
The US and the West have had a far less zero-sum calculus and have instead looked at longer term models of responsible global leadership focused on the defense and expanse of democracy, the rule of law, market liberalization and human rights. The West has also wised up to Russian zero sum games and has the ability to win-out in such games if it holds the resolve and determination to do so. By winning such conflicts convincingly, the West may be able to deter such game playing in the future. The hope then, is for Russia to let go of old glory and come to grips with its realistic position in the future, as an important partner in global security that recognizes Russia can become more competitive economically if it not only opens its economy to outside investment and competition, but also takes on the task of reforming its legal norms and security culture away from one of grand oligarchs and old soviet shakedowns to an emphasis on the equitable enforcement of rules designed to balance government, investor, consumer, worker and business relations.
If confidence and trust can be built on re-commitments to the Salt II treaty, if Ukraine can be persuaded to let go of Crimea and allow for special trade relations with eastern Ukraine allowing for access to Crimea and cooperation can be renewed with a focus on defeating not only ISIS in Syria, but also on preventing the reemergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, ISIL in Iraq, nuclear weapons in Iran, civil war in Libya and Yemen then perhaps both Barack Obama and Vladamir Putin, and their respective intelligence agencies can recognize that the world is not necessary wrought with zero sum calculations, it actually presents a massive map of common interests where win-win-win agreements can be accorded. The truth lives however in the recognition, that abstract political rights and total security are of secondary importance to functioning and performing economies. The Republicans will of course attack Barack Obama for appeasing Russian aggression and the Russians undoubtedly will be enjoying Vodka to toast another victory, but in avoiding the pitfalls of egoism much bloodshed can be prevented, global security and prosperity outlooks can improve, as counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination can bring about a new page in American/Russian relations. Ironically, these types of conflicts can be best avoided in the future by firmer and clearer redlines, promptly and credibly enforced, with an improved understanding and accommodation of each other's regional interests. The prevailing logic is, that sometimes you need to increase the risks of war in the short-term to reduce its risks in the long-term. There are some tense fault lines in the Middle East and in Europe, but if these conflicts can be managed with cool and clear heads, there will actually be a lower risk of war as the dust settles and the new normal takes shape.
America should hold to five non-negotiables: 1. An Iran free of nuclear weapons with a means of monitoring any nuclear energy programs and improved counter-proliferation measures to prevent a regional nuclear arms race 2. A recognition of Ukraine and other Eurasian countries inherent right to self-determination, and all country's right to self-determination when security concerns permit 3. Cooperation in continuing the fight against designated terrorist groups 4. Working to improve a more stable international security environment and 5. Improving economic standards by working to enforce fair rules governing an open global economic system 6. Prioritizing investments geared towards improving economic performance.
If Russia does not take clear steps to ease tensions in Ukraine, reign in Iran and combat ISIS in Syria, then the US should increase support for the government in Kiev, consider working with the Israelis to clear out a Christian homeland in Southern Syria along the Israeli border (careful to avoid Russian naval installations south west of Damascus), increase support for Jordanian efforts to create a stronger and more thoroughly vetted free Syrian Army, bolster support for Saudi efforts to re-take the Yemeni capitol from Shi'ite Houthi rebels, work more closely with the Egyptian and UAE governments to influence the fighting in Libya and remain open to punitive airstrikes against Iran's nuclear program. The US cannot half ass its commitments to these causes, it needs to provision the financial resources, weaponry and resources necessary to win.
