Saving America from Nazism and the Earth from Communism
As an avid historian and
professionally trained political scientist, realist strategic
considerations and the applicability of historical lessons always
take precedent in my recommendations. As I understand more about the
IA world, I recognize the reality that in my independence I have
traversed a far wider range of roles than traditional bureacratic
norms would entail. Being so well rounded has encouraged and
facilitated extensive degrees of independence. By developing new
means of technological monitoring, identifying valued and reliable
accademic and media related sources, fusing a broad based faculty of
knowledge, while building wide reaching networks, I have facilitated
the development of a nuanced and new approach to intelligence that
can be valuable in closing the gap between IC agencies and homeland
security, helping to connect the dots between intelligence and policy
making. While seniority within the ranks of the Intelligence
Community rightfully encourages a tighter adhearence to standard
rules, protocols and time-tested procedures of intelligence, the
principal/agent relationship offers younger agents the opportunity to
be more experimental, to take greater risks and develop newer
methodologies and approaches relating to the intersect of
intelligence and policy maker, at least according to the public
administration department. Looking at past US intelligence failures,
most have stemmed around issues relating to group-think, politcal or
bureacratic considerations and an excessively limited range of
acceptable perspectives or opinons and assesments to be formulated.
In order to more effectively connect the intelligence community to
the policy community, the intelligence community needs to recruit
more open-source specialists, exercise critical thinking skills,
retain a better balance of generalists and specialists, encourage a
wider multitude of ideas similar to the tenth man role in Israeli
intelligence (or what the text book refers to as the Devil's
Advocate) and continually prioritize work on the most critical issues
of the day.
From the descriptions of what goes
on inside the NSA and in the CIA headquarters, an obvious problem
exists in compartmetalization. While compartmentalization is a
safe-guard against intelligence breaches, broader meritocratic
transparency is a safe-guard against bad decisions and agenda
supporting intelligence creation. Institutionalizing appropriately
trained open-source experts, reduces the tunnel vision that can
result from tightly controlled Intelligence Analasis. With youtube
and so much user involved media, one can better monitor what is
actually happening more closely, understand the attitudes or
perspectives of various populaces and make more careful
considerations when formulating assessments relating to policy.
Using the internet to cull a broader range of reporting, foreign and
domestic, combined with a closer monitoring of foreign governments
who have formal twitter accounts and websites that they use for
strategic messaging all facilitate a broader intellectual
understanding of world events. Think-tanks and policy tanks, leading
experts in international relations and foreign policy strategy,
become priceless assets. Engaging with the populace, getting out in
the field, and meeting with or interacting, listening to the issues
they are facing or perspectives that are trending is vital to modern
intelligence assessments. Identifying the Psyops and staying focused
on the moves of the movers and shakers is crucial. The most recent
Ebola scare was a pathetic ploy, high rates of Auto Immune disorders
in Liberia lead to high death rates, America has far lower risks for
such and it was obvious that the media was being directed to cover
the story to divert attention from the very real problems surrounding
Operation Inherent Resolve. These types of ploys create serious
negative reactions from a voting and tax paying public increasingly
mistrustful of the media and our govenrment. If the media would stop
trying to direct public opinion and instead focus on fostering a
robust, informed national dialogue than our representatives could be
held to a higher standard of policy formulations and as a result,
produce a stronger role for Intelligence Analysts since their
impartial, scientifically accurate role would be welcomed and highly
valued.
Increasingly, even America's
military and intelligence agencies needs to think more and more like
a marketing firm than a govenrment, it needs to consider how America
is being branded around the world, perhaps before all else if it
wishes to grow its economy, maintain its leadership position and
increase the security of our citizenry. It cannot hope to maintain
leadership by way of psyops and propaganda, instead our government
needs to learn to set the realistic expectations, tell the truth to
its citizens and deliver. For this reason, the Intelligence Analysts
ability to make accurate assessments is increasingly important.
Providing IA with the tools, and encouraging them not to produce the
product the buyer wants, but emphasizing accuracy, precision and
relavance is key. One means of reducing tunnel vision and increasing
accuracy is to tap into a select range of open-sources. Stephen C.
Mercado, rightly identifies, “the revolution in information
technology, commerce, and politics since the Cold War's end is only
making open sources more accessible, ubiquitous and valueable.”
There is need for more research on how open source can be effectively
infused with HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT to help produce the more
nuanced and sophisticated assessments necessary to craft effectively
administratable policy in an increasingly complex world. As a matter
of personal practice, I read the CFR daily briefings, visit the
brooking institute, the cato institute, the economist, the washington
post, the new york times, bloomberg in addition to a number of key
international security related issues that I monitor via a customized
Google news tab. I stack my bible with the portable machiavelli and
Robert J. Art's “The Use of Force: Military Power and International
Politics,” while prefering to watch pertinant documentries over
sports or sitcoms. I replaced gangster movies with an ever-ready
stream of either historically accurate films, war films or other
series and flims relating to the various government agencies. I
charted out all of the various govenrment agencies so that as events
break, I could practice considering what directives I would be making
as a resposne.
I've branched out into Public
Administration, studying Public Administrative Theory under the
direction of an individual raised in the Sunni system who has done
extensive research looking at how the Hezbollah's success has stemmed
from its ability to run a number of successful charities where the
official government has failed. The Islamic State found early
success under a simple formula of giving old Ba'athist technocrats
their old jobs back, divesting money from the Capital and sending it
instead to the municipal councils focused on restoring basic services
such as energy, hospital care and water, while ousting the national
security forces which were percieved as violently oppressive agents
of a rival ethnic and religious group. While the actions against the
Yahzeda's and rhetoric of expanse required response, argueably one
could have undercut some of the violence by facilitating transition
into the dissolution of Iraq and Syria into its more natural ethnic
and religious sect based states. A reasonable compromise can be
struck between the various parties, the matter of peace, then rests
on finding mechanisms of guaranteeing those terms so the various
actors in the conflict can accept a cease fire. As I've been saying
since the run up to the bombing campain against the Islamic State,
that the actions are equivalent to pooring water on a griese fire,
the rational policy choices would have been to either suffocate the
fire or to contain it and allow it to burn itself out. If I am the
policy maker, than I want my Intelligence Analysts to provide their
expert opinions in easily digestible and logical form, with clear and
compelling rhetorical arguments backed by science and imperical
evidence, but also considered against common wisdom. What I do not
want, is works looking to reinforce an ideology or advance special
interests. Ultimately, the government should be held to the same
standards of fraud and deceptive marketing practices as any other
marketing firm.
I spend long hours in the library
studying great generals, great kings, effective presidents in an
effort to understand the makings of greatness. I always look to get
into the minds of key players, to anticipate their next move and game
out what they may do as I plot my course. Looking to monitor the
implemention of policy, I sought to develop more advanced open source
methodologies, or at least routines, and when I am at my computer, I
have simultaneously put a web-tab for the DOJ, DHS, CIA, State
Department, FBI, Governor, County, Mayor, Whitehouse.gov, Senate,
Congress, Attorney General, NY times, Washington Post, Jerusalem
Post, Iranian website, Saudi govenrment sight, Qatari sight, Bahrain
Site, Syrian Site, Iraqi Sight, Turkish News, Egptian News and Libyan
news, and monitor them in live time, moving from tab to tab to see
the effects of policy. I look for blogs, view jihadist propaganda,
read the blogs of more intelligent witnesses to events on the ground,
review battlefield tapes, study formations, compare tactics, study
strategy fervently and look upon the world as a chess board, angling
for allied advantage. I read the diplomatic meetings between Qataris
and Iranian govenrment for example, and even in their public
statements it is amazing how much valueable intel you can pull. I
have my girlfriend translate the papers from mexico city, and I agree
with Mercado, who strongly recommends “more language officers,
organizing an OSINT fleet, exploiting private sector technologies,”
but he misses out on the evolving styles of management and
organization that cultivates the best productivity from the brightest
minds. When I meet someone, I ask their country of origin, their
work, their studies, their culture, discuss politics and try to find
ways to help. The key is to gleam the best work of the best, to
internalize and organically infuse it together to recognzie the
patterns and trends predictive of what will come tomorrow and to
position to stay ahead, maintaining differentiation without ever
sacrificing quality for the sake of equality or conformity.
Critical thinking is even more
important than analtyic thinking. Understanding the relationship
between two variables is a very small component of intelligence. I
recommend priortizing the issues that intersect between those that
are most important and those that are simplest to solve. Doing such
will create a reality where you are continually solving important
issues successfully and therefore, increasing one's value to the
policy maker. Defeating the Islamic State is difficult, minimalizing
its threat to Arabian government's is easier. Securing cooperation
from oil rich regimes with small militaries by providing security
agreements and technical assistance in the fight against terrorism is
easier than invading heavily armed countries with limited
self-sustaining economic prospects. Investing resources in struggles
where clearly beneficial outcomes can easily be produced, is better
than investing resources in struggles where long and hard fights will
produce outcomes lacking a clear benefit to our republic. Bolstering
military presence to hold ground, is easier than re-taking ground.
Opening and securing markets is easier than democratization.
Providing law and order in line with custom, tradition and religion
is easier than imposing western notions of law. Credible deterent
strategies are often easier than preventitive strategies. Building
functional municipalities is easier than building functional nations,
providing financial resources to local managers discretion is easier
than enforcing a tightly controlled set of objectives and means.
Embracing diversity, encouraging responsibility and pushing economic
improvements is easier than altering ideologies, changing behaviors
and forcing acceptance of state-centered conceptions of law and
authority. Convincing people to stop fighting and accepting
agreeable terms, is easier than forcing them to fight on to total
victory and unconditional surrender. Dividing and creating balance,
is easier than conquering and dominating. Carrying on tradition, is
easier than change.
Phase VI planning in the run up to
the second Iraq war was heavy on ideology but short on ciritical
thinking. The result was an insurgency that drained our treasury.
COIN was as fine a means of combatting the insurgency as any, but
ignored the wisdom of avoiding trying to fight one all together.
Asking why your agency or department is working so hard to maintain a
specific social construct is a pertinent critical question to ask?
This is not to say that you should dismiss intelligence as simply a
construct devoid of fact or without the need of attention. I think
it is safe to conclude, however, that the pressures on the
intelligence community in the run up to the Iraq war serve as a
cautionary tale about the problems that can result, when
expectations of a specific consistent intelligent result are levied
on the Intelligence Community. Ultimately, however, hind sight is
twenty-twenty, with known mistakes made, Saddam was still a threat,
had chemical weapons and the aftermath of US departure has shown that
Sunni Ba'athists are quite capable and willing to work with radical
jihadists. David T. Moore has an exceptional book on the importance
of Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analasis. His use of case
studies, illustration of critical thinking failures and successful
negotiating tactics relating to intelligence is incredible. Critical
reviews of case studies and data-sets are important mental excercises
that any IA needs to vigorously seek out and consume. Keep your mind
sharp, neuroplasticity, game playing and other more basic faculties
such as science, math, literature and writing augment logical
reasoning, analytic reasoning and the criticial thinking necessary
for success in the Intelligence Community. Basic common sense never
hurt either.
Retaining a better balance of
generalists and specialists is important, there is a need for
well-rounded broad based experts, and there is a need for
individuals with narrow but meritocratically resolute authority on
specific subjects, countries, groups or regions. Balancing the
intelligence community with combinations of both, is the surest means
of preventing excessive group-think and intelligence errors.
Devising management strategies and work spaces that encourage greater
amounts of interaction and collaboration will advance more nuanced
and sound reasoning in Intelligence Analasis. A study of management
strategies at successful private sector companies such as Google can
help us. It is important that the work flow of Intelligence
Analaysts is in part dedicated to analytic questions in an area of
expertise; however, it also needs to be balanced by other
intellectual activities and broader context of current events,
cultural studies, strategic studies, science, historical studies and
comparative politics. A more diverse aray of methodologies and
requirements to encourage analysts to look at a more diverse aray of
perspectives would also be appropriate. There may be need to
encourage a wider range of intelligence product types. Opinions
on policy may not be an intelligence analyst or intelligence managers
purview, but an honest answer to a direct question may be all the
policy maker needs from his intelligence analysts. Having looked at
the government's direct disseminations closely and comparing them to
the work from leading international relations experts and government
focused academic researchers at the London School of Economics and
Political Science, Georgetown University, Stanford, Harvard,
Cambridge and Oxford. UC Berkley and UCLA are fine institutions, but
be weary of the communist and socialist influence. Increasingly,
economics needs to be the vital faculty of intelligence analysis,
particularly assessments as to how different policies, leaders or
events will impact the volume of global trade and health of markets.
Personally, managed multiple
advocacy is an engraved component of my ethos, studying the mistakes
by Kennedy in the run up to the Vietnam war and looking at some of
the mistakes in the Bush-Cheney Administration, this is neccessary
moving forward and there is a need to vigorously promote the “perfect
maket of ideas in the manner that John Stuart Mill believed made
liberalism conducive to the emergence of truth,” even if at times,
they conflict with broader strategy agendas and previosly intended
long term plans that the spontaneity of history has redirected.
Effective command is a higher priority than control, and effective
command often requires altering the course and changing direction.
Richard K. Betts uses the intelligence failures in the run-up to the
1973 war to position a reconmendation “to institutionalizing
dissent by assigning to someone the job of articulating apparently
ridiculous interpretations to ensure that they are forced into
consideration.” I like this idea and would enjoy taking the
position. Working as a safe-guard against group think, involving the
tenth man approach, could prevent major events from occuring without
anticipation and contingency planning. For example, Is General Xi's
consolidations of power and the public proclomations of allegiance
from some 53 senior military officials (“China's Imperial
President” by Elizabeth C. Economy) signs of his control over
China, or preparations for imperial expansion? What if Barack Obama
is acting as their Manchurian Candidate? What if there is coup by
Nazi influenced general? How can the United States prevent communist
pressures at local levels and nationalist pressures at the federal
level from squeezing the American Middle Class into revolt? Are
pressures from Gulf states to get US support for an invasion of Syria
and to arm rebel groups in Jordan a coordinated trap to exhaust US
resources before turning their attention to an invasion of Israel?
What if Mexico fell to communists? What if Russia coordinates a wide
spread betrayal of America? What if nuclear deterrence no longer
held, because regimes called each other's bluffs? What if a country
called a bluff incorrectly? Could a convincing scientific discovery
proving creationalism become a black swan event? Someone should be
vigorously exploring these scenarios and someone should be exploring
what strategically, operationally and tactically the United States
could do in response. Betts contends that such an IA role could
become Sophist, and be seen as “one crying wolf,” but clearly
there is need for increased “Team B” criticisms. Betts concedes,
“the intermittent designation of devil's advocates in periods of
crisis, when the possiblity of diaster is greater than usual.”
Interestingly, Betts identifies that “the most realistic strategy
for improvement would be to have intelligence professionals
anticipate the cognitive barriers to decision makers' utilization of
their products.” How to go about doing such, and defining ethical
barriers to such insights is the greater challenge.
By recruiting more open-source
specialists, strengthening critical thinking skills, retaining a
better balance of generalists and specialists, encouraging a wider
multitude of ideas or multiple advocacy and continually dedicating
time in each day to the most critical current policy related issues
of the day, the intelligence community can more effectively connect
the intelligence community to the policy community. More than
anything, however, I believe that the intelligence community needs to
follow through on its recruitment of more creative minds. Doing
such, requires making resources to be made available and
understanding that they need to be managed very differently for they
are accustomed to being in low supply and high demand, we are not of
the same discpline of the military and cannot reasonably be expected
to conform to a uniform set of protocols or such strict measures of
discpline. Think-tanks and our text books have spoken regularly about
the importance of recruiting more creative minds, and with an
extensive career in music, film and marketing to augment my academic
experience and acumen, giving the past three years of what would be
most profitable time in entertainment, I have been troubled by the
lack of consideration or accomadation for the variance such powerful
minds demand. There's recruitment, but no sensible means of
facilitating follow-through for the acquisition of the fill the
blank-space types so heroic in the oppenheimer project and at
bletchey park, for we are not blank slates capable of traditional
military style indoctrination. The intelligence community needs to
bring in a wider range and more diverse range of faculty expertise,
beyond military to be sure that IA is not simply a means of advancing
bureacratic interests. Unanimous consensus may make a result seem
scientific, but it also can undermine the foresight of valuable
varying perspectives taking a broader set of variables and goals into
account. For the part of policy makers, they need to do a better job
at delegating fund raising tasks and be provided larger amounts of
resources for imperical and qualitative based policy reviews so that
they are free to focus on doing the jobs they were elected to
perform. Part of IA work in the future, should be monitoring the
affects of policies. Working for government, this should be the most
basic analytic function of government intelligence. One way to
improve impartiality for intelligence analysts, and to encourage them
is to provide life-long positions similar to Judges, greater
long-term financial security for policy makers, and longer-term and
less restrictive employment contracts for Intelligence Analysts. For
the policy makers, visible positioning in a court, similar to how
former royal courts were assembled, would be of tremendous value in a
world where data is transmitted so quickly that out of sight, is
often out of mind and bureacratization creates compartmentalization
and distance, often detrimental to the formation of valuable and
transparent working relationships that provide a larger context from
which Intelligence Assessments can be presented. Imagine if all key
policy makers had visible regional intelligence experts and experts
in the more pertinent fields relating to govenrnment, before him or
her at all times, assembled in a court with a ready flow of business
professionals and foreign dignataries. Successful rulers understood
this reality and kept the best and brightest in their courts at all
times. Just because we are a Representative Republic, is no reason
that our elected representatives should not have functional courts
modeled after the best european royal courts in lieu of the common
bureacratic business style offices prevelent today. I believe such
will awaken more ingenuitive leadership, better policy decisions and
stronger relationships between policy makers and Intelligence
Analysts. The surest way to improve homeland security is a simple
matter of making sure that everyone has a reliable flow of hard
currency, property, capital and privacy and then trusting us to know
best how to manage our time and spend it. Stress, despair and
desperation are the causes of nearly all homeland security risks.
It's not so much dots, but the supply lines that need connecting. My
recommendation, revert to the wisdom of Adam Smith's “Wealth of
Nations” and laissez-faire.
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