On The Origins of the Islamic State and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East

On The Origins of the Islamic State and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East

by Theo Johnson

    The Islamic State developed from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, a group originally founded by “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” after his exposure to more radical Salafi elements in Jordanian Prisons. Working the Jihadist circuit of the time, he fought in Herat, Afghanistan against coalition forces before fleeing to Northern Iraq. Initially, according to analysts, he fought with Ansar al-Islam, which was actually a militant Kurdish group looking to establish a sovereign Kurdish State. Interestingly, it was largely Zarqawi who was presented as the “link” between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. While the clear contrary agendas of Kurdish separatism and Saddam’s grip on power is obvious, the inability of Saddam’s forces to apprehend him, in part because of the US enforced no-fly zone eclipsed more rational decision-making. Never the less, as the US entered into Iraq, Zarqawi formalized his Al-Qaeda in Iraq banner by taking allegiance to Al-Qaeda’s leaders: Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Viewed as preposessing and dauntless by his followers, he was a competent jihadist commander with a four pronged strategy of attack. First, he targeted international and coalition forces in an effort to isolate American forces. Second, he targeted police stations, recruitment centers and Iraqi politicians to deter Iraqi cooperation and undermine the transition process. Third, he carried out terrorist attacks on civilian contractors and humanitarian aid workers to attenuate the rebuilding process. Fourth, he sought to provoke Sunni-Shi’ite conflicts by attacking Shi’ite targets in an effort to trap Coalition forces in the cross fire of a civil war. The fourth strategy put the group at odds with Al-Qaeda and angered the Sunni populace. In coordination with the Robert Gates lead Surge of US troops, the Sunni tribal leaders were empowered to enact revenge, providing weapons so that the Sahwa or Awakening movement could enable Sunni Tribal militias to weaken the group’s influence. In this process, with increased air strikes in the region, Zarqawi was killed and his third in command, Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi was captured. Aby Hamza al Muhajir replaced Zarqawi. Terrorist incidents spiked in 2006, to 6,631, but fell to 6,210 in 2007 before falling down to 3,256 in 2008. With 20,000 more US troops in the region and 100,000 Sunni tribesmen on the US payrolls, 2,400 AQI members were killed and 8,800 captured out of an estimated 15,000 active members. In 2010, the group, rebranded itself as ISI, or the Islamic State in Iraq, and saw its two primary leaders, Abu Hamza and Abu Omar killed in counter-terrorism operations, with Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, then being named Emir of ISI and Abu Muhajir as his War Minister. (As a legal matter, one can clearly see that the Authorization to Use Force applies to the group calling itself the Islamic State, because Abu Bakr was under Al-Qaeda's chain of command and helped al-Zawahiri, a key commander involved in the planning of the September 11^th World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks). Even before the departure of US forces, at what was then, considered “the height of its strategic and tactical success, AQI could claim the lives of 185 people in a single day of coordinated attacks, maintain a complex and reliable web of regional smuggling and recruiting networks, and command thousands of conventional guerilla fighters and suicide bombers across the entire country, even though it is unlikely the group made up more than 15 percent of the total Iraqi insurgency at any given time.” Al-Qaeda in Iraq, was often seen as a secondary threat to Nationalist Insurgents, and it appears there was some tactical effort to play them against each other as the prior’s tactical efforts to provoke civil war, went against Nationalist Insurgent goals of creating a cohesive, sovereign and viable Iraq.¹

The Context of its Development

       The combinations of the Surge and Sunni Awakening, severely weakened AQI and ISI, reducing its numbers and nearly defeating it. Unfortunately, the inability of the Obama Administration to make the necessary troop commitments to secure troop immunities prompted a rapid exit from Iraq. While there were electoral and domestic considerations in doing such, strategically this was a horrid move, weakening our bargaining position with Iran over its nuclear program and upsetting the Shi’ite-Sunni balance in the Middle East. The combination of Al-Qaeda terrorism and nationalist insurgents prompted a terse environment at the polls in Anbar Province where the Sunni’s were disproportionately underrepresented. With a national parliamentary system, this meant that the dominant parties would be a moderate Shi’ite party, a radical Shi’ite party, with dueling Kurdish minority parties and Sunni Parties primarily gaining voice through the deal struck to place a Kurdish President, Shi’ite Prime Minister, and Sunni Vice President with limited formal powers. It was not long before the Shi’ite Prime minister, Al-Malaki ordered the Sunni Vice President to be arrested on specious claims of terrorism. With the Vice President behind bars and sparse Sunni representation in Parliament, the political bargaining process became entirely unbalanced and pro-Shi’ite maneuvers prevented the Sunni Tribes formerly on the US Payroll from being integrated into a regional national guard as promised. Al-Malaki undermined merit in his military by promoting and demoting according to loyalty, often according to religious and ethnic affiliation. Under represented, without integration into the National Security forces, Al-Malaki began an oppressive campaign to quell insurgency that often ordered Shi’ite loyalists to repress the Sunni population with a heavy hand.

       The Arab Spring, in part prompted by Barack Obama’s Cairo speech, then promoted by a wide range of journalists, social media and other leveraged acts of civil disobedience prompted massive discord where within Tunisia’s leader resigned, Egypt’s Leader stepped down and after Gadhafi prepared his army and tanks to slaughter the Eastern Benghazi tribes, UN Security Approved no-fly, no-tank zones were used to oust the world’s longest ruling dictator. Combined with the Seal Team 6’s successful mission against Osama Bin Laden, there was tremendous optimism and the sense of very real international progress. The Truth and Justice party came to power in Egypt, Islamists and Liberals cooperated in Tunisia, and the secular government in Libya oversaw the world’s fastest growing economy. Understandably, the excitement for more revolutions in the Arab Peninsula were less welcomed, as the combination of radical Islamic movements and a lack of experience in governing or managing the economy were legitimate causes of concern to global security and the interests of the populations. College professors prompted protests in Syria, where a lackluster economy under tight control of Bashar Assad’s Allawite religious sect, were met with a violent military crackdown that was capitalized on as a propaganda ploy to rally an array of dissatisfied components within Syria, primarily coming from the various Sunni groups that as a majority, have long been governed under the heavy heal of the Assad dynasty.

         For the US and their partners, what was bad for the Syrian and Iranian governments were generally seen as good for them as the regional imbalance prompted by the Bush Administration’s decision to oust Sunni Saddam’s Ba’athist regime and replace it with a Shi’ite regime closely aligned to Iran, was contrary to the long standing defined national security interests of protecting cooperative Arabian Governments and the balance seeking policy of “divide, but don’t conquer.”² With pressure being ratcheted up on Iran, and growing pressure to address the appallingly oppressive tactics of Bashar Assad, which included the usage of Sarin gas, the heavy bombing of civilian populaces, starvation campaigns, the torture of rebels on national television and broadcasting of other new weapons disintegrating rebel columns the Obama Administration made a determination to intervene with retaliatory cruise missile strikes, but was largely rebuffed by Congress when diplomatic agreements to surrender chemical weapons arsenals were struck. The event, none-the-less, only further galvanized support for the rebel groups and moderate rebel generals became conduits for arms and money to a wide umbrella of rebel groups. While the prevalence of Al-Qaeda’s al-Nursa Brigade, and the surviving offshoot of AQI that had morphed into the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or Islamic State in the Levant, lead by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi operated in the periphery, training for more mild rebel groups began to take place in Jordanian Camps, and also supposedly in Turkey.

       It has been rumored, and would have been strategically sound, to have used the Sarin attacks to justify a bombing campaign on Syria’s forces directly linked to the attacks and also strike at Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, positioning for Bashar Assad to step down in exchange for amnesty as an acceptable intermediary governor palatable to the remnants of Assad’s government and moderate rebels replaced him. Inaction and tacit support from portions of the International Community, and a brief mutiny in portions of the navy, looking to keep the Syrian war civil, prompted by Russia’s effort to keep a client desperate to buy and use new weapons, allowed for Iran to coordinate with Hezbollah and Bashar Assad to escalate vicious attacks on moderate rebels. Surgical Strikes at that time, would also have increased credibility in nuclear negotiations with Iran and altered Putin's calculations with Ukraine.

       It has been reported, that Bashar Assad deliberately turned his military campaigns towards the moderate rebels, buying oil from regions controlled by the Islamic State so that he could advance his public relations campaign looking to present all of the rebels as criminals and terrorists.³ For some of the Drussian and many other portions of the rebellion, this is simply not true. They were driven by desperation and oppression, came from middle and working class positions in society and sought to create a democratic government more responsive to their needs. Many were Sunni, and as a result found financial support and weapons from Sunni-Arabian governments, from Turkey and from their private citizens.

       As fighting went on, however, the situation became significantly worse. With Hezbollah and the Syrian government tactically targeting the moderates and the US/British governments making stalwart efforts to bargain with Iran in an effort to avoid war and win elections, the Syrian military brutality wore moderates down as the more radical elements of Al-Qaeda’s Al-Nursa Brigade and Abu Bakr’s Islamic State gained strength, new recruits and territory. With the Arab governments unable to formally support these groups, tensions increased within their domestic populations. While it is unclear whether or not Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State was deterred from continuing their attacks against the Syrian government in response to their usage of more brutal and horrifying weapons of force, or actually had cut some type of deal providing oil in exchange for acquiescence, Abu Bakr’s increasingly competent fighting force that had absorbed several of the other more moderate Islamist groups in the fighting, turned their attention towards Iraq where a departed US Military, disenfranchised Sunni Tribal groups, a struggling Shi’ite government in Baghdad and poor performing Iraqi National Army allowed for rapid gains and a number of luke warm alliances between former elements of Sadam’s Ba’athist party and a repressed populace looking for change, prompted elements of the Sunni Tribes to turn their guns on the Iraqi government and send the Iraqi National Army and Baghdad directed security forces running. A slow response from the United States, a pre-mature determination not to re-enter into the conflict and perhaps political calculations to avoid taking stronger ownership in the problem before mid-term elections, allowed for Abu Bakr’s group to quickly secure gains and with an influx of Chechnyan fighters experienced in asymmetrical war-fighting against Russia, clever tactics where within bands of 1500-2000 jihadists on pick-up trucks would storm their predetermined targets from four sides, surprising them, often prompting retreat or surrender, prompted a series of victories for the Islamic State. Towards the end of this past summer, in August 2014, ISIS was able to take control of Mosul, looting its treasuries of 400 million dollars, declaring himself Caliphate and significantly elevating the profile of his group which at that time had an estimated war chest of close to 2 billion dollars.

       Coming from a background in business, with supposed ancestry from Mohammed, Abu Bakr successfully managed his operations with close statistical measures of monitoring, prioritizing winning over local populations with efficient governance that had been lacking under Shi’ite control. Hospitals were opened, he targeted damns to control the water supply, and he did simple things like facilitate food administration. He continued to defy Al-Qaeda, attacking rival religious sects and allegedly allowing his troops to loot and rape to encourage there continued fight. Oil proceeds, ransoms and other illicit markets such as big game are believed to contribute revenues. He made bold populist proclamations promising to attack Baghdad and Jerusalem. While tactically somewhat successful, they were somewhat foolish as the flight of the Yehzidi’s created enough popular pressure in the US for intervention. Efforts to back ISIS off of the Yehzidi’s and prevent the Islamic State's advance into Irbill, the capitol of the Kurdish regions of Iraq, quickly escalated the conflict with a heavy supply of arms and air bombing campaigns geared towards “degrading and destroying” the Islamic State. As the early air campaigns, primarily consisting of humanitarian support to the Yehzidi's began, ISIS retaliated by amping up a horrifying media campaign that included the beheading of American Journalist, James Foley, who was decapitated as he cried out, “America is the real killer.” Films such as “Flames of War” and an ongoing number of movies contrasting the harsh violence of their wrathful takeovers with the serenity of the aftermath, continued to prompt more recruits from around the world who have been taking ferries to the Turkish coast and then walking across a sparsley patrolled border into the war space.

       While the US, a number of allies and a coalition of cooperating regional governments joined the air bombardment, ISIL continued to order attacks on Fallujah and Kobani, at least providing the appearance of continued expanse, and working into a public relations strategy to show the in futility of air strikes. Allied regional interests have been further complicated by the actions of Boko Haram in Nigeria, an ongoing battle in Libya between Islamist elements and a secular parliament whose election was nullified by the Supreme Court and the Pakistani prodded Taliban looking to re-emerge in Afghanistan as Coalition forces were set to hand over control of bases and operations to the Afghani National Army. With new leadership in Afghanistan and a continued Taliban threat, night raids have been re-authorized and the publicized draw down will be slowed.

        More recently, the Islamic State has continued to see more recruits enter into the conflict while holding control of Mosul, broadcasting mass killings on the internet, dumping Sunni tribal leader bodies at the gates of Baghdad and waging a steady stream of suicide attacks around the US embassy. They have called for sympathizers to mount attacks wherever they may be, and from London to Australia, to Oklahoma we have seen Islamic State inspired attacks transpire. In the past week we have seen a massive Hamas plot, coordinated from Turkey thwarted by Jewish Intelligence, a massive bombing in Nigeria carried out by Boko Haram, hi-jackings and executions of non-Muslims in Kenya by Al-Shabaab and reports of potential ISIS plots within the United States.

Obama Administration’s Strategy from early Summer to the Mid-term Elections

       The Obama Administration was slow to respond, with an extended vacation at Martha Steward’s vineyard, a burst of diplomacy unsettled by a distractive panic proliferating response to Ebola, mid-term elections and negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program in Genevieve, Russia has continued to challenge the US position over Ukraine. While Barack Obama spelled out a clear strategy of carrying out an extended bombing campaign in collaboration with a number of international partners from Europe and the British Commonwealths, including friendly Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and United Arab Emirates to name a few, to assist the new Unity government in Iraq, the Kurdish Pesh Merga and moderate Sunni rebels by working to train a more competent army in Jordan composed of Sunni volunteers from across the Arab world along with Syrian refugees to fight both the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and to work to oust Bashar Assad.

       While Turkey has been interested in entering into Syria to take ten mile wide stretch of land all along the border to address the influx of refugees, it has so far been halted for fears that it will play into Qur’anic end time prophecies of the Roman Empire, (or NATO) attacking from what is Turkey and then embolden the Islamic State's determination to fight on in the face of massive casualties, where the Qu'ran predicts one third of all muslims will flee and never be forgiven by God, one third will die and one third fight and enjoy the Caliphate that emerges after the first Caliphate is exposed as a false prophet where at which point, the true Caliphate will emerge from Instanbul as the region is taken back from Turkey.⁴ As a result, the Obama Administration has pursued an earnest effort to pull together a coalilition of Sunni faces to engage in the undertaking of fighting the Islamic State, an attack that must be waged from the South of their theater of operations.

Critical Review

      It is not my intention to insult the ideas, plans or goals that the Pentagon or Barack Obama are pursuing or to politically attack or insult him personally. As long as he is our Commander and Chief, he has our full support in the lawful execution of his duties as President. The point of this report is to be critical of what is my best understanding of Barack Obama’s plan, so that our government can make sure that the plan we pursue moving forward is the strongest plan available.

     In my opinion, the Obama Administration made a devastating mistake by making a commitment not to put troops on the ground. While he has increased the number of troops by 1500 recently, it is a far cry from the number of forces that would be needed to quell the fighting in Anbar and North East Syria. While there may, in fact be clandestine forces, there is going to be a need for a substantial number of embedded special operations forces to facilitate the type of momentum necessary to strengthen the confidence of Iraqi security forces and turn restive portions of the local populations in those regions against the Islamic State. I do not believe that it is realistic to think that the Sunnis of Anbar are going to trust Shi'ite military forces, nor do I think that placing Anbar province back under the control of Tehran alligned Baghdad is in the long-term interests of the United States of America and the cooperating members of the Arab League. Any peaceful future for the Iraqi region is going to demand significantly reduced control from Baghdad and significantly increased autonomy for the Sunnis and Kurds. This end result would actually work to favor the creation of a more manageable Shi'ite/Sunni regional balance, and by adopting the Kurdish State, the US could pursue air-bases in our effort to deter Iranian Nuclear ambitions as our European allies continue providing humanitarian and economic assistance.

      A long, drawn out bombing campaign, in my opinion, is only pouring water on a grease fire. Air bombardments, without troops on the ground to guide in the strikes have higher amounts of collateral damage that in turn, push the local populations to the side of the Islamic State, and then advance the aims of their propaganda machine to garner more recruits, copycats and affiliates around the world. An extended bombing campaign will undermine the Islamic State’s ability to provide basic government services and worsen the humanitarian situation, which in turn, will further radicalize the resistance that was once moderate, and now, extremist. Instead of carrying out a bombing campaign, I would have sought to use Special Forces Operations to attemt to capture Abu Bakr and transition control of the Islamic State to someone more capable and willing to pursue peace with the regional governments, Israel and the West, but open to keeping the governing structure modeled after the early Caliphate courts, looking more towards a human resources solution than forcing a totalitarian governance from Baghdad and Damascus on rival ethnic groups. The right Caliphate could actually do a tremendous amount to stabilize the region and serve as an arbitrator between conflicts within Islam and between governments, and help bring terrorists posing as jihadists to Justice. Essentially, at this point, I would focus less on keeping Iraq together and destroying the Caliphate and more on replacing the Caliphate with someone that is not a terrorist, rather someone the regions leaders can live with and the Umma will respect, focused on the peaceful care for their souls and administration of the five pillars, similar to the role of the Pope in the Catholic Church today.

     Furthermore, by insisting on the active participation of the region’s Sunni Governments, Barack Obama has complicated the stability of their regimes who may find increasing numbers of Islamic State supporters emerge and create problems as a result. The bargaining process, has forced Barack Obama to make the removal of Bashar Assad a primary goal of any campaign and he appears to be making a commitment to build up a rebel Sunni army in Jordan. While I love the ever-ready rhetoric of little Sparta in the United Emirates, the US has to be somewhat cautious not to advance the perception of a War on Islam by waging war on Political Islam. While I would certainly like to see Bashar Assad go, there is need to consider how to prevent a total slaughter of the Allawites and Shi’ites in the wake of his defeat. Additionally, increasing tensions between Israel and Jordan, make the prospect of building up the Sunni Rebel Army risky, and one can easily see how without adequate US or British ground forces it could potentially become casually aligned with the Islamic State and after defeating Bashar Assad’s military, turn its attention to Israel. Egpyt used deception in the run up to the 7 day war against Israel, and it is not impossible that some of the Middle East's leaders are using the Islamic State to garner more guns, military training and money from the US in a deceptive effort to build up capabilities to wage a third war against Israel. With the current leadership across the Middle East this is less likely to happen; however, I would urge caution, that efforts on the part of the more Islamist regional leaders to maintain credibility with the Arab street if Abu Bakr is not destroyed could potentially result in broader military attacks against Israel by portions of the Arab Leauge: mainly Turkey and Qatar. It is for this reason, that any build up in rebel Arab military capabilities, has to involve significant US military presence to help hold these groups accountable to their approved missions.

           Charles Kaufmann in “Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars,” explains the difference between ideologically driven and ethnicaly driven civil wars, asserting that ethnic wars are not political competitions for individual loyalties, but contests over contorl of territory whose outcomes are determined mainly by the balance of military force.” In ideological wars, there is “loyalty competition,” wherewithin a rebel group with rival ideology can recruit members from rival groups, in ethnic conflicts, however, your side in the conflict is pre-determined at birth. As a result of this, “ethnic civil wars are not guerrilla quagmires,” and “foreign aid or foreign troops can make a tremendous difference to the local balance of forces and, unlike in ideolgoical counterinsurgencies, outsiders can reliably tell friend from foe.” This means that in a conflict with clear ethnic divisions such as in Iraq and Syria, “provided that interventions aim at saving lives and establishing defensible territorial settlements, not at reassembling shattered multiethnic states, outside powers can resolve ethnic wars with finite effort in finite time.” From this logic, it is clear the US should intervene in Iraq and Syria, but its goal should realistically be to create a political solution involving redrawn borders accomodating of irreconcilable differences existing along ethnic divides. For the sake of peaceable agreements, autonomy, may be the term of use, with soveirgnty a practical impossibility, but still, the possiblity of stopping ethnic war and preventing genocide is certainly possible, and if consensus can be achieved towards a plan for its fullfillment, it becomes a moral responsibility. When inadequate controls are in place; however, and fighting is increasingly only influenced from the safety of the skies with sparse contact or control on the ground, actions of moral intention can rapidly shift to moral hazards.

      Additionally, according to Mark Mazzetti of the New York Times, an internal CIA study commissioned by the Obama Administration, “concluded that many past attempts by the agency to arm foreign forces covertly had a minimal impact on the long-term outcome of the conflict,” and that, “they were even less effective... when the militias fought without any direct American support on the ground.”⁵

      The best outcome that can possibly be pursued at this point, is not an extended 1 to 3 year bombing campaign where the supposedly moderate Sunni rebel forces are increasingly build up and made into a rival professional army, but a negotiated peace that takes advantage of the established 14 Syrian Governates. Latakia and Tartus would remain under the control of the Allawi sect, Hama, as matter of strategic convenience, may also remain under control of the Syrian establishment, but would be governed secularly and be home to Syria's Shi'ites and Christians. Al-Hasakah would be a Kurdish governate with a popularly elected president. Alleppo would be a secular Sunni governate. Al-Raqqa would be a more religiously conservative governate where a more traditional practice of Sunni Islam would be practiced on condition that it is at peace with its neighbors and does not try to intefere with governence of neighboring governates. The Syrian born remnants of Abu-Bakr's organization would be expected to retreat, disarm and surrender to this governate where racism, anti-semetism and anti-american rhetoric calling for Jihad would not be tolerated. Deir Ez-Zor would be another moderate Sunni Governate. Idlib and Homes would both need to be moderate, tolerant and secularly mixed ethnic and sect governates. Damascus would become a secular Sunni governate, Rif Dimashq would be a moderate Sunni governate. Quneitra and Al-Suwayda would remain moderate and secular Druzian governates. Darra would be a secular and moderate Christian governate with Sunni Populations in the North and US military bases and a supporting Maronite Christian population based near the border of Israel. I'm calling for permanent US bases at this position because they are spaced away from Russian Naval instillations on the coast and in the area where Al-Qaeda's Al-Nursa brigade recently overran and overwhelmed Philipino military men serving on a UN peace keeping mission. US military presence in this region could help guarnatee adherence to peace accords and provide a safe homeland for Christians in the region.

      It would obviously be ideal, if more moderate populations lived in that region, providing for maronite christian populations remaining from the old Principality of Antioch to inhabit the areas of Lebanon and Syria along the Israeli border is an ideal solution, but it cannot be executed in the draconian manner by which Ariel Shalom pursued it in 1982. In the midst of these negotiated cease-fires and occassional relocations, cash should be used to compensate the purchasing of homes, and new homes assigned. The degree of social displacement is so bad at this point, that a centralized entity taking the refugees and assinging them homes in regions with their religious and ethnic kin may be the only means of ending the Syrian Civil War.

      I am interested in the prospect of allowing for Prince Faisal or Abdullah II of Jordan to rule over the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria in an effort to dislodge Abu Bakr, to allign the regions interests with the Saudi Arabian government and its allies and engage in a project to send the Syrian elements active in Iraq back to Syria, to send the Chenchnyan and Algerian agitators back to their respective countries of origin, and begin the difficult process of working with the Sunni tribes to incorporate them into the proposed regional Iraqi National Guard that would be at the regional governors command while provided significant economic and security related autonomy from the Baghdad government, whose secretary of the interior is now a Shi'ite militant. By allowing for a more natural Sunni Supra state lead from Riyad and cooperating with the Arab League, the elements of politicised Islam engaged in terrorist tactics can be sidelined and brought to justice as the Arab and Sunni groups oppressed by Shi'te regimes can enjoy the wider justice and peace that the order of King Abdullah II of Jordan, Prince Faisal and his collaboration with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia could competently provide with adequate council and administrative support. I fear that the Free Syrian Assembly is too fractured and invested in marxist theory than it is in Capitalist realism to have even remedial success governing. The Anglo-American Empire's relationship with the Arabs was injured tremendously after it turned over control of Syria to the French and the United Nations and to turn over control to the Faisal line with the provision of a competent Privvy Council instead, would perhaps be of substantially higher value to the peace and prosperity of the region and its people. The key to peace does not rest in either marxism or the Qu'aran, the Muslim brotherhood or Abu Bakr, rather in Mohammed's treaty of Medina, and a moderate and sensible Caliphate such as the Hashemite Dynasty decended from the tribe of Mohammed and former Sherif of Mecca. By increaing the prevelence of the Treaty of Medina in Islamic Jurisprudence, the provisions requiring Muslims to protect the region's Jews and those who help the Jews, can counter-act arguments for war. Emphasizing the common semetic blood of Arabs and Jews, while framing the Iranians as Aryans, will ceate an internal cause for solidarity in resistance to their regions aspiring hegemon to the North.

      The best way for the outside word to assist these regions, is to use available resources that encourage a healthy economic ecosystem where the business of the populaces daily lives undermines the need for either violence or grievances. The future of humanitarian intervention has to involve an improved means of encouraging economic development and the formation of self-sustaining human stewarded ecosystems that balance regional self-sufficient capabilities with global integration. Formally, the country of Syria would be split into two countries, with Allawistan, comprised of Latakia, Tartus and Hama, and the rest composed of Syria. Al-Hasakah may leave Syria to be integrated into either the Kurdish components of Iraq or Turkey. This is a matter for arbitrated discource between the government and Istanbul and Irbil, and a decision for the populace, but at this point, Bashar Assad has forfeited his say in the matter. The numerous outside jihadist fighters that have joined the fight without their native states backing, would need to be returned to their home countries.

       There has not been nearly enough looks at how to deescalate the situation. The above outlines what a partition of territories would look like, and looking at recent history, breaking up nations and allowing them to disintegrate into ethnically based governing parts brought civil wars to an end in areas such as the former Yugoslavia. The main challenge, then, rests in providing adequate guarantees and mechanisms of punishment to force and then enforce a cease fire. If an agreement in principle between the directly involved players of this conflict, the Syrian Government, the Rebel Groups including the Islamic State, the Kurdish dominated regions of Iraq and Shi’ite regions of Iraq can be brought to an agreement of terms, then Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Jordan can be guided to secure adherence to the agreement which would prevent ongoing civil war and slaughter while providing for autonomous ethnic based states. I think that while most would have no problem with this end, it is going to be difficult to accomplish this with Bashar Assad and Abu Bakr both remaining in power. In my opinion, both should be captured and arrested, and brought to the International Criminal Court for trial. I'm not against other means, if ordered according to just cause procedure. There are times however, when some form of amnesty, or palatial house arrest in exile, is appropriate if it prompts their surrender and brings hostilities to a close.

        Simply because a clear and reasonable, mutually agreeable outcome and terms for peace exist, does not necessarily mean; however, that they can be achieved. “Civil Wars rarely end in negotiated settlements. Between 1940 and 1990, 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions. Instead, most internal wars ended with the extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side. In fact, groups fighting civil wars almost always chose to fight to the finish unless an outside power stepped in to guarantee a peace agreement. If a third party agreed to enforce the terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeeded regardless of the initial goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants. If a third party did not intervene, these talks usually failed.”⁶ Therefore, a third party needs to intervene and the United States of America is the preferred party to enforce the terms of a peace treaty. If the USA truly cannot do this, I believe it is better that Jordan take the leading role from Turkey. I do not believe, however, that such is the case and am optimistic that closer collaboration between the CIA and State Department along with their allied counterparts could establish these ends. If not, the civil war will end on the battlefield, because credible guarantees on the terms of the settlement are almost impossible to arrange by the combatants themsleves. Peace agreements fail, not because terms for peace cannot be made, but because, “at a time when no legitimate government and no legal instiutions exist to enforce a contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm, and disengage their military forces and prepare for peace.” The reality is that “it becomes almost impossible to either enforce future cooperation or survive attack,” so “only when an outside enforcer steps in to guarantee the terms do commitments to disarm and share political power become believable,” and so, “only then does cooperation become possible.”⁷ From this, I contend that the US will need long-term air bases in the Kurdish controlled portions of Iraq, a sizeable military base along the Israeli/Syrian border where Christion Maronites will be provided refuge and renewed control of military bases in Ramadi and perhaps along the Syrian/Iraqi border. If US ground troops are brought into a larger combat role, I contend that controlling the Euphrates and lush farm lands along its edge are the key to controlling the region.

        Balanced in these criticisms, is the current agreement with Iran. While allowing for some form of nuclear energy program may be acceptable, it is erroneous to believe that Iran is not after a nuclear weapon. It is a common tactic of states ambitiously pursuing nuclear weapon to negotiate with the International Community to buy space to develop the enrichment capabilities, before turning their attention to the delivery system. Additionally, there has not been any efforts within these negotiations to curtail Iran’s continued funding and arming of not only Hezbollah in Lebanon, but also in Bahrain, its continued and ongoing support for Hamas and even elements of Sunni extremism, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq during the US occupation and the Khorasan group active in and around Ra’qqa. Unleashing Iran, without first undoing Shi’ite gains in Iraq by creating an autonomous Sunni controlled Anbar province and Kurdish State, is going to create an imbalance that overtime may result in their efforts to expand their empire and invade the Arabian Peninsula. Economic sanctions alone, are unlikely to prevent or deter Iran from gaining nuclear capabilities because santions prompt the establishment of monopolies that further increase the relative strength of the Iranian establishment and reduce the costs of armed conflict that exist between states with wider economic interdependence. There is no telling what damage Iran would inflict on Israel, because it is hard to believe, that an open attack on Israel would not create demand for a response from a US voting public that is largely Christian, substantially evangelical and completely unwilling to stand buy and allow for a second holocaust. Even if the US government, or its president did nothing, the people would certainly respond, either by impeaching the president, by civil strife, or perhaps even by provoking covert Israeli or even Republican action. Neither of these outcomes are acceptable nor necessary.

I ask what would General George Patton Do?

        General George Patton was known for being an astute war historian, so he would look at other historical battles in the region to find a sense of destiny in the matter. The US has not had trouble taking territory in Iraq. The two invasions of Iraq in the past 25 years were both tremendous successes. The trouble has been in the aftermath. The first left Saddam in power, the second brought us into an effort to force democratic transitions. While carrying out such an invasion with ISIS's strength severely weakened is an enticing prospect, there is very real need to consider shifting Phase VI planning strategies away from democratic and state centric policies, to smaller ethnic based governing units that put the burden of govenrment on the local populaces, re-orienting their focus away from Baghdad and closer to their homes. By keeping some of the technocrats of the Ba'athist regime and elevating the role of positive elements in the religious institutions, the government can function in its basic provision of providing utilities and infrastrcture, as security forces shift focus from counter-insurgency to market security, a sense of normalicy can return and standards of living would improve. The United States military can work to change expectations and move away from appeasing the increasingly unpopular far left with exit strategies, and instead devise and publicize sustainable and cost-effective strategies to stay.

            I would recommend moving investment away from IMF and World Bank style investments in governments, and instead direct the bulk of financial resources to banking institutions offering Sharian approved products that provide credit for housing and business, strengthening and improving market practices in an effort to help restore the dignity and independence of the people. Securing the banks, marketplace, infrastructure and houses of worship, providing more focused roles for security that are less invasive will help reduce tensions and undercut the draw of insurgencies. It seems, that in building stronger governing capabilities the liberal world order has inadvertently gave governments the ability to dominate their marketplaces, causing inexperienced leaders to trample fragile economic ecosystems, increasing hostilities towards the liberal world order. While there are reasons to doubt the accuracy of a Russian released scientific study by Yury Rubinsky at the Center of French Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, showing that as many of 14% of the population of France and alarmingly nearly 27% of war fighting aged youths 18-24 in France hold favorable sentiments towards the Islamic State, suprisingly high levels of support are obviously an expression of frustration with the highly unpopular, high-tax, overly controlling, big government socialists that came to power with President Hollande. Essentially, national socialism fails again. Policy makers in Washington have to come to grips with the reality that the younger generations become very religious within a few years of their graduation, and if their religious beliefs are not guided into Christian insitutions they will increasingly sympthasize with Muslim extemists sharing a common enemy: National Socialism. The apparent truth is that outside of the halls of government and public universities God, country and capitalism rule over nationalism, communism and purely scientific doctrines. Libertarianism or neoliberalism are increasingly popular trends across both Republican and Democratic voters and the internet has galvanized intense hostility towards anything reaking of national socialism or military dictatorship, of the proletariate or otherwise and an increasingly keen watch for communist partisans is the popular reality. Leftist criticisms critical of corruption in congressional politics and conservative criticisms of an effort to ferment and enforce a totalitarian system are both salient and correct. It is not democracy, but religion that is winning in the battle for hearts, minds and loyalties and government efforts that extend beyond infrastructure and traditional and less evasive domestic security operations have largely been met with popular political resistance despite rampent cartel movements and a wide multitude of suspicious activity from foreign nationals. While I would apprecite the resources to conduct more in depth studies, early reasearch where I explored the correlations between academically respected indexes of legal rights, democracy and economic liberty, I found (to my suprise) that the leading indicator of Insurection appears to center less around political or legal rights, rather instead around indicators of economic liberty; and therefore, as a Master of Homeland Security I responsibly have to recommend adjusting policies away from those that create extensive centralized government bureacracies and instead urge promoting an ethos of economic liberty and allowing for religious organizations to provide for the bulk of all charitable and humanitarian support in the Middle East. On the subject, as it relates to the United States of America, I recommend gradually reducing the reduncancies and costs of our multi-tiered governance by centering the bulk of domestic government administration at the county level, with cooperative federal governments focused on using its capabilities to promote stable political regimes conducive to trade, investment and safety around the world, and state governments focused on resolute security in our soveriegnty and borders. Federal legislatures would then primarily be responsible for managing budgets and funding our financial and physical security while the State legislatures primary responsibility would rest in funding the counties' ability to provide education and administrate common or judicial law according to the respective state's constitution. The Byzantinum tax code should be thrown out and replaced with simple progressive tax brackets for income tax, sales tax and property taxes. Municipalities primary role and revenue would stream from their provision of utilities. Lowering the costs of government and steamlining the Government's ability to provide basic services will dramatically improve our economic strength and undercut tensions conducive to domestic insurgency and help facilitate long-term forward positioning abroad, conducive to the maintainance of a world order provided for by an open market-based economic systems, vibrant religious practice and flourishing sciences, arts and athletics. Weakening nations and strengthening smaller governing units such as counties and corporations would reduce the propensity for larger wars, increase civilization's vigor, facilitate the success of the mainstreet economy and accommodate a more diverse range of ethnicities and religious practices enterance into a prosperous and robust middle class. By reducing the scope of federal and state governments, increasing the supply and widening the distribution of currency, driving more transactions, creating larger incomes and increasing the velocity of money the US can underwrite the costs of what Robert J. Art sees as necessary, contending that “for it owns interests the United States should continue to forward deploy its troops in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf.” Off-shore balancing can help expand the American lead security umbrella; however, the idea of closing and exiting US bases in such volatile regions is an idealistic pipe dream. I would instead expect more focused and more prevalently baracked troop presences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a growing number of military, security and fair trade agreements with friendly Asian, African and South American Governments that may also provide a growing network of military bases for operations, and improved conditions for investment and business. The diplomatic and military missions, however, need to be focused on maintaining peace and stability, because “Interdependence is a vital interest because it leads to peace and stability (and prosperity); however, peace and stability must pre-exist in the international system order for interdependence to take root.”⁸

          An aggressive bombing campaign with the appropriate coordinating efforts to arm and provide communications with the Kurd's Pesh Murga, Sunni Tribal leaders from the Sunni Awakening, the Jordanian military, the Turkish military and the Iraqi National Military can certainly break the momentum of Abu Bakr's terrorist organization, but the ability to retake territory and the achievement of Barack Obama's stated objective to degrade and destroy the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant, is most likely going to require him to break his stated commitment not to deploy ground troops. If President Barack Obama is serious about destroying and degrading the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant to prevent something worse from emerging in its defeat, I would estimate a need for around 75,000 professional allied troops in Syria, 50,000 in Anbar Province and strongly consider some type of military presence in Libya to bolster the beliguered efforts of General Khalifa Haftar to restore order, protect the electoral process from Islamist intimidation and to bring Libya back to some level of economic functionality and control by an elected parliament restrained by the consitution and some symbiotic role for Islamic courts. The US, British and allied militaries can defeat radical Islamist militants quickly if freed up to do so, with one military commander recently bragging that the task could be accomplished in two weeks. I'm not one for overly rosy forecasts; however, adequately supplied and provisioned, competently commanded, our allies have proven themselves to be very effective in waging offensive advances as counter-terrorism operations. Our military personel seem to prefer these types of operations. Setting a realistic expectaiton of a permanent peace keeping troop presence of around 15,000 in Syria, 20,000 in Iraq and perhaps 30,000 in Libya could help guide these troubled states into a permanent, prosperous and secure peace that will align themselves with the Arab League governments' desire for regional stability and the expanse of the post-communist open Anglo-American market-based System. It was Osama Bin Laden negotiating for the withdrawal of all foreign militaries from Muslim lands, the US and our allies need not negotiate with such terrorists simply because a few cowardly communist intellectuals are under the erroneous belief that capitalism, empericism and western presence do not advance the interests of civilization and therefore, the human species. The security provided by Western militaries, wanted by the region's governments and their stabilizing affect are all in the the interests of the governed populations and the influx of investment and organized business activities and mutually agreeable contracts are the surest means of improving standards of living. The US and our allies do need to keep budgetary restraints in mind, but can provide for their bases within current budgets by mild restructuring and human resourcs adjustments along with peeling back spending on some fanciful hi-tech weapons and domestic surveillance systems deemed unlikely to ever be needed or used in combat and increasingly seeming to have unintended negative pyschological consequences on the populaces domestic and abroad.

        Civilian Control over our military; however, is vital to the health of our Democratic Republic and until President Obama changes his directives, the DoD and military apparatus should focus on fine tuning coordination between the Pesh Merga and allied air assets to make it a goal to take control of Mosul and al-Hasaka, with ISIL and ISIS command and control capabilities in Fallujah and Raq'qa destroyed and degraded. Coordinating and collaborating with the United Nations and the Arab League, portions of the Sunni population displaced by Abu Bakr's terrorist organization can be integrated back into functioning and peaceful emirs and trained to help retake portions of their homelands from Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's control. The benefits of Barack Obama's plan is that it will help slow the momentum of a powerful terrorist organization, help to prevent genocide and create openings for moderate and sensible Sunni Muslims to dislodge Abu Bakr's terrorist organization. With tomahawk cruise misssiles hitting Raq'qa and Special Forces zeroing in on Abu Bakr's location, his wife and child in custody, he may be coerced to order a surrender. Barack Obama's plan, particularly if it involves strengthening allied air power in Kuridsh controled portions of Iraq, will also strengthen our position to negotiate terms with Iran and also limit the potential American targets in range of Iranian retaliation if a military strike on Iranian nuclear capabilities is launched. Military preperations to keep open the Straits of Hormuz are bolstered by our Navy's support for airstrikes against Abu Bakr's terrorist network. It also encourages an increasing degree of self-sufficiency and responsibility on the part of the Arab League and their countries' respective military capabilities. Even so, even critics of interdependence and extended deterrence recognize “deterrence theory holds that extended deterrence is strenghtened when the guarantor deploys its own military forces on the protected state's territory.” The bigger issue then, rests in maintaining the “balance of resolve.”⁹ Something the exceptional character of the United States of America can maintain with the help of dynamic leadership and the promotion of articulate, intelligent and persuasive arguments to maintain our broader strategic vision. The world is simply not ready for an offshore balancing strategy.

       In Benjamin Netanyahu's recent address to the United Nations he brought focus to a larger point. He argued, that to defeat ISIS and allow Iran to go nuclear would be to win a battle and lose the war. I concur with his reasoning. Despite all the politics and high price tag, I agree that a nuclear armed government in Tehran poses a greater threat than the risks of instability and terrorist groups with only conventional capabilities. The chaos of this whole situation can be played into our favor. Iranian intelligence will see a flood of weapons, US or British operated airstrips along their border in Kurdish Iraq, a resolved display where 74% of US public supports airstrikes against ISIL and need to seriously reconsider its posture in negotiations. At any moment, our operations directed towards ISIL can be shifted towards a suprise attack against the Iranian regime's nuclear facilities. US negotiators should not feel desperate, Khomeni, Rouhani and Iran should be forthright and ready to comply in full with the terms propsosed by John Kerry and the State Department. The US should not puruse a strategy of global dominion, where it is the leading provider of humanitarian aid and incessant anagonist of protests and a longer list of liberal human rights that require heavy and expensive, debt-ridden governments, rather instead pursue what Robert J. Art calls, “The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” which entails the establishment of basic goals, a clearly deliniated list of national interests and a strategic approach to protecting them. Varying from Robert J. Art, I contend that the primary American interest lives in stable political and legal norms conducive to the conduct of business, enterprise and initiative, achievable by increasing energy independence and focusing the administration of human services and governance at the county level, keeping Greater-Britian unified under an increasingly competent and active crown, secretly restoring the Chinese Emperor as a magistrate to the English Crown and disguising him publicly as the Communist party leader, and establishing a Caliphate palatable to the regions leaders, at peace with Israel and cooperative with the West in matters of trade and security the United States will be able to balance its budgets and catch up with Europe in matters such as education and health, while being freed up to provide badly needed assistance to their near empire in Mexico and South America. Strengthening the crown will help improve interopability and the coordination of a better balance and rotation of troops in foreign bases with a scaled back mission centered around securing large cities, protecting governing magistrates and protecting markets, maintaining strategic air bases and special operations bases, we can effectively exert power that advance the interests of English speaking, law abiding people, the native populations and undercut the violent rejection of larger liberal nationalistic and socialist efforts around the world. By increasing military presences in the Fauklands, Australia and Nepal, the English can augment the credibility of the American security umbrella. The Catholic and Anglican churches in Africa, Europe and the US, and the better staffed and stabilized Islamic charities and humanitarian organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, can help cushion the transition from state centric to market centric systems of provision. Morality, ethics and higher law are areas where well funded education and marketing campaigns can fill the gaps left by the reduced role of central governments. The more difficult task is going to exist in finding ways to undercut the high profit margins and high policing and imprisonment costs created by drug prohibitions and the war on drugs. These costs are particularly high in transit states, so combinations of regulated legalization and taxes provisioned to rehabilition and drug use prevention, could offset the mild increase in short-term useage that would result from the end of prohibition.¹⁰

         With such accomplished, the US and its allies can improve their capabilities to “1. prevent an attack on the American homeland, primarily by keeping out of the wrong hands nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, which are also referred to as weapons of mass destruction; 2. preventing great power wars and destructive security competitions among the Eurasian great powers; 3. maintaining secure oil supplies at stable prices, in large part by keeping Persian Gulf reserves divided among the oil-rich Gulf States <stabilized by a peace seeking Caliphate if neccessary>; 4. preserving an open internatinal economic order;” 5. <spreading funcitonal republican and regal forms of government capable of improving literacy rates, mathematical accuracy, scientific competency, equality before the law, the strength of courts, the scope of liberty, the role of democracy and the practice of business, the provision of human rights enshrined in the universal declaration of human rights and the triumph of the universal value embodied in the Golden rule to help prevent both genocide and terrorism>; 6. <protecting the environment and preserving fragile animal and human ecosystems/habitats>.¹¹ Advancing these ends requires the US to improve our finesse of force, concealing its iron fist with a velvet glove, finding improved popular means of romantising and fermenting awe with modern warfare and weaponry. This can be achieved by extending beyond film and books, to also tap into the popularity of hip-hop and rap, to develop subgenres that explore the complexities and heroism of government officials in the spy, military and federal policing realms. By curtailing the persecution of popular drug useage and its suppliers, being more careful in its handling of the mentally ill, focusing on liberating self-expression and relieving underlying stresses and compensating the damages of prescribed chemicals and allowing for effective folk remedies such as alchohol, marijuana and various herbs and teas, continuing to address issues of police violence and shift policinig strategies towards providing safer enjoyment of liberty, the government can rebrand itself and capture the upper ground on “cool.” By using less sadistic tactics of interrogation, admitting wrongs and bringing some of the proponents of such tactics to justice, advancing corrections reform, the US can clean the slate and aggressively promote the popular mystique of the spy world and policing agencies while broadening support for our military and clandestine actions abroad in our fight against terrorism.

Joseph Nye, asserts that “Power is the ability to attain the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce it vary in different contexts,”¹² with that power coming from a combination of hard and soft forces. The good will of 9/11 was injured at times by the corse diplomacy of first term, Bush Administration, with many of the policies that white house attorneys promoted, undercutting our ability to seduce with the soft appeal of our cultural products. The Statesmenship of Barack Obama significantly improved our face and the perception of America around the world, and the combination of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State and the quiet competence of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense brought about widely successful foreign policy implementation. In my opinion, when they were replaced by John Kerry and Hegel, the increased assertiveness of Sec. Kerry was out of balance with the passiveness of Sec. Hegel, combined with the democratic party's misguided campaigning efforts to double down on peace in an effort to rally the democratic base for mid-term elections, and the creation of a Barack Obama character by the right wing poitical machine that was at least in part, fictitious, fed into widespread mistrust of Obama across the military, resulting in the perception and read from foreign rivals that America's current adminstration is weak, and therefore a slew of contenders have sought to challenge us, force American departure from forward positions and fill power vacuums with unnacceptable entities. Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kery need a stronger Secretary of Defense, determined to maintain a “lean forward” foreign policy, and Ashton Carter is an ideal nominee to bridge the often misinterpreted intellectualism of Barack Obama and the US military's need for strong, decisive and competent leadership. The US needs to defeat the Islamic State, retake Anbar Province, force political change in Damascus and help bring cooperative and competent political regimes to power in Libya, while ratcheting up pressure on Iran in negotiations with stronger rhetorical and military posturing relating to its nuclear program and support for terrorist groups such as Hezbollah. It also needs to provide better technical advice to the cooperating partners of the Arab league, reigning in the finances of terror while looking at longer-term plans to stabilize oil prices once Iran and Russia have capitulated and reverted to a more cooperative role as it relates to global security and world trade. The US in exchange needs to curb its zeal for fermenting protests and overthrowing regimes, taking a realpolitik plus approach to Ashton Carter's “Preventive Defense Doctrine,” because “appocolyptic violence is at our doorstep,” and “war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.”¹³ Kenneth Waltz is wrong, nuclear proliferation to Iran will not create stability and improve security because the actors of the future are not states and only strong American leadership can eliminate Anarchy from the global order as it relates to states and pressure them to crack down on terrorist networks. Jospeh Nye recognizes that, “Power today is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three demensional chess game. On the top of the chessboard, military power is largely unipolar, and the United States is likely to retrain primacy for quite some itme. On the middle chessboard, economic pwer has been multipolar for more than a decade, with the United States, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players and others gaining in importance. The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations. It includes non-state actors as diverse as bankers who electronically transfer funds, terrorists who traffic weapons, hackers who threaten cybersecurity and challenges such as pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely diffused, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony.” It is on this bottom board that the greatest risks exist, for many of these groups have existed in states of such severe destitution for extended lengths of time, that revenge and wanton destruction are often their only end. Strength against Strength, America continues to hold an advantage, with a choice of deterrence, coercion or preventitive defense, it is in the conflicts that Gen Dempsey has described as “Strength on Weakness” that refinements in strategy must be made because “terrorist actors rarely have return addresses” and if revenge is the terrorists' only goal and they have no populations held accountable to retaliations, then improving intelligence capabilities, international communications and means of intervention centered on psychology or behavior can become more palatable alternatives to brute police force, detention and coercive interrogation. Even so, more war fighting lies ahead, and fanaticism in itself can not be made a culprit in our fight. As Walter Lipeur assets, “it is a hopeless exercise to try to explain terrorists, individually or collectively, wholly in social categories such as national or social oppression, messianic belief, or protest against injustice. In the bloodiest terrorist campaigns the element of crime and madness plays an important role, even if many are reluctant to acknowledge it.” Defeating terrorism, then cannot become an open ended battle targeting fanaticism or religious extremism and its sources as terrorism, it has to involve focused campaigns against violent criminal actors within such networks. After open battles are won, the underpinning madness of terrorists needs to be addressed, both in its causes and psychology, with a balanced strategic approach that protects religious practices and the role of religious institutions while challenging the more radical conclusions of violent fanatic ideologues. Seemingly, efforts to bolster states and security forces undermined these ends, increasing protections for economic liberty and the role of religious organizations and local forms of government seems to actually be the wiser approach moving forward.

          The only way to bring this choas to an end is for the US and its allies to commence an operation it knows well and has conducted successfully already twice before in the offensives of operation desert storm and operation enduring freedom. An amphibious, air and ground campaign can easily retake these territories and destory the terrorists in our way, but our end game will have to be dramtically redefined from yesteryears and yestermissions, the advance of democracy needs to come second to the total defeat and disarmerment of our enemy. There will be no exit strategy this time around, it will be a strategy to stay, to turn these regions profitable and extract the costs of our occupation from the governed population. With their weapons removed, an acceptable caliphate will be empowered and sanctuaries to practice their religions peacefully will be built, we will build functional cities and the opportunity to create a healthy marketplace, but it will have to be some time before Iraqi demos can have power to rule, they will need to meet an extensive and longer list of pre-requisites. The Jordanian King, the preferred candidate for Caliphate, understands what these pre-requisites are and the trouble that democracy brings to illiterate and inadequetly educated populations lacking notions of tolerance, free speech, party pluarlity, market economics and the rule of law.

          Such actions will bolster our position in negotiations with Iran, because as Robert Jervis says, when it comes to making its threats more credible, “the first is to voice them publicly and unambiguously.” As Jervis explains, “US policy makers could also stop publicly expressing their reluctance to use force and instead emphasize that they think an attack on Iran would benefit the United States.” Such an attack, would indeed severely push back the timeline under which Iran would be able to produce both the nuclear material and the delivery system for a bomb. While such an attack may embolden them to create a bomb, it could just as easily alter political conditions and prompt regime change, and by holding forward positioning as Israel did in the West Bank, Golan Heights and Gaza strip, and holding defendable air-bases in Kurdistan, Armenia, Azebajjan and Afghanistan with Battleships and Aircraft carriers along the straits of Horum and destroyers in the Black Sea, the United States can closely monitor for nuclear activities and continually punish Iran with airstrikes with each and every violation. As Jervis contends, “a U.S. strike would deal a dramatic blow to Iran's nuclear effort, serve as a powerful warning to other potential proliferators, strengthen the United States' global reputation for resolve and possibly even trigger an Iranian revolution.” The leaders of our Arabian partners would be all to happy to participate in such a war and the popularity of the Islamic State would largely be consumed by the wave of war and in such, be undercut, allowing for a transition of leadership. Such postering bolsters deterrence, but deterrence in its self is not enough and the decision by Barack Obama to nominate the author of “Preventive Defense” as his new Secretary of Defense is not a miscalculation. Fmr Secretary of State Albright inspired soft negotiating, shuttle bus diplomacy, combined with the lack of credible threats results from flawed military posturing by Gen. Hegel have lead to failure. Even with Russia in the equation, the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where “in confronting Khrushchev, Kennedy ordered actions that he knew would increase the risk not only of conventional war but also of nuclear war.” The prevailing logic is that at times its necessary to “increase the risks of war in the short run, to decrease them over the long term,” and doing such requires credible threats and bold posturing. Kennedy, for example, loaded bombers with nuclear weapons, “put them on alert status,” knowing that Russian intelligence would see such, bolstering credibility before the offer of a compromise to turn nuclear missile positions in exchange for canceling plans to deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba.¹⁴ Marita Kay shows in “Predicting Soviet Military Interventions,” through a sample base of conflicts with Russia that there are four basic types of disputes: Verbal Diplomatic, Arms Delivery, Less than 15,000 and more than 15,000 and from such she creates an alogorythm of sorts that according to the facts of any specific conflict can guide scientifically accurate predictions of Soviet Response. I contend that Vladimire Putin's failing efforts to create a Eurasian Economic bloc, provide reason to argue that Russian Behavior, particularly according to his traditionalist understanding of Russian history, make such an allogorythm valid. Boxed in, desperate for resources as oil prices have plummeted and Europe has moved away from dependence on Russian natural gas, thrown the bone of Crimea, stronger posturing and more inclusive diplomacy may guide cooperation as it relates to pressuring a change of leadership in Syria, and a large say in what happens in the aftermath of strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and Syria's mediterranean coast. The political popularity of misguided risk averse foreign policies have proved unnsuccessful, with Iran seeming intent to push forward with an ambitious nuclear program, the success of a “change in negotiating style,” is not the success needed to ease concerns about what it will do as it eases towards break out capacity. The proponents of a nuclear armed Iran, such as Kenneth Waltz and Robert Baer, as much as I respsect both, are erroneous. Robert Baer's conclusion in “The Devil We Know” is wrong because Iran is not capable of serving a stabilizing role, armed with a nuclear deterrent it will only be embolened to increase its clandestine activites around the world, threatening vital American interests. Even Robert Baer cautions that according to the Koran, a Shi'ite advance on Medina precipitates end times. From Robert Baer's description of his experiences, it is clear that Appoclyptic visions seem engraved in the psyche of Iran's intelligence community. The US needs to hold strong to its strategy of “divide, but do not conquer,” and use the emergence of the Islamic State to ferment a better balance between Shi'ite Iran and its proxies and the Sunnis to the South. Eric Edelman hits the nail on the head, arguing that, “what was missed was that the Islamic Republic is a revolutionary state that rarely makes judicious economic decisions. In fact, the notion of integration into the global economy is frightening to Iran’s highly ideological rulers, who require an external nemesis to justify their absolutist rule.” Sanctions strengthening the authority of the Iranian regimes, removed outside competitors from the marketplace and provided for the rise of an oligarchy of monopolists that would prefer to avoid price competition with Western suppliers and so as long as China continues to buy Iranian Oil and the British presence in Iran is taught as a dark colonial experience then the extensive oil reserves offsetting the costs of their socialist state are unlikely to prompt many concessions to Western negotiators, thus without military action they likely will approach breakout capacity. Low prices per barrel may advance negotiating leverage, however lower oil costs may also simply force them to pull back oil subsidies and increase hostility towards America and Saudi Arabia who will serve as the scapegoats for the Iranian govenrment. Unlike Russia, Iran is a revolutionairy theocracy and while it understands rational state behavior, unlike Russia, the duality of Iranian philosophy stemming from its Zoroastrian roots and worship of evil make its commitment to mutually assured destruction all the more credible. The Islamic State, then, may be a gift to the interests of US foreign policy, an excuse to gain bases on and around the periphery of Iran and a means of restoring the regional Sunni/Shi'ite balance that has long been at root in our regional policy even if in the 80s, we understood it as balancing strategy between Iraq and Iran. While the standing Authorization to Use Force covers the Islamic State since Abu Bakr was under a chain of command with an oath of loyalty to Al-Qaeda, it would not hurt for a formal declaration of war to be made and if war is declared, General George Patton would not stop his march until he reached Tehran.

      The tougher question lives closer to home with white skin, as the church going majority of Americans tired of being forced to compete with massive global corporations and socialist cronyism within the high finance of Europe and allegedly within the Obama Administration, has a sense that a disproportionate amount of government dollars are being invested in helping poor minorities at a time when many white Americans from higher middle class backgrounds are increasingly dependent on government and in need of help at a time when they crave independence and desire self-sufficiency. The returning prevalence of racial biases and related racial rhetoric are sad, as many minorities have become the most competent and productive, however I fear that miscalculations by the liberal media in the way they covered and carried the homicide of Mike Brown and the mobilization of black protest that has resulted from the inability to indict Darren Wilson, have lead to a regression in race relations, as minorities are increasingly looking at racial bias as the cause of their problems, and so the need for “Martin Luther King Jr.'s prophetic call for racial justice” becomes deeply needed, and so it went; too often younger generations have been taught to look to government in times of need, as opposed to initiative and enterprise at a time when the democratic party has done too little to elevate voices capable of communicating liberal ends in religious language, or phrasing the cause of the working man and progressivism as a Christian duty and the Church as a vehicle for its achievement. It's too bad, because the future of political power depends on such abilities and sustaining support for counter-terrorism activities in the Middle East and North Africa, along with the raising of funds for non-profit initiatives and political campaigns will depend on articulate and nuanced religious perspectives. Such grievances were at root and manifest in the mid-term elections and much to the dismay of my Atheistic colleagues, “clergy across the country have sensed what we see in the data, namely, Americans’ growing aversion to blurring the lines between God and Caesar.”¹⁵ 

    “American Catholic bishops have argued, ‘acceptance of nuclear deterrence is “strictly conditioned,” not only on a constant readiness to move to agreed arms reductions as drastic as the most skillful and dedicated negotiations permit, but also on a reluctance to depend on nuclear weapons for purposes beyond that of preventing nuclear war.” And so, any reset in relations with Russia begins with a recommitment to section 1303 of the SALT II treaty. By improving relations with Russia, and encouraging a more constructive role in Syria and Iran, the United States and allies can focus on restoring order at home, in its near empire, and in Iraq and Afghanistan, even if it means confederating Iraq into three autonomous states and keeping bases in Afghanistan longer than planned. Realistically, the policy of destroying the Islamic State in the Sunni portions of Iraq and Syria is going to be counter-productive because it is simply an idea of submitting to God, and so its destruction is driven in Islamophobia and ethnocentrism. While there will likely be ongoing counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation operations in the region for some time, by providing Christian and Sunni homelands in the region and working to find a Caliphate willing to make peace with the Jewish Homeland in Israel, Baghdad and Damascus according to the Treaty of Medina, a tolerable degree of order, peace and prosperity can be restored.  Achieving this end, however is not a simple matter, it requires tightly coordinated, closely monitored and responsive combinations of focused military force, intelligence and diplomacy.  What America and the world needs more than ever is steadfast leadership, competent command and decisive action. 

1“Al-Qaeda in Iraq” by M.J. Kirdar for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (c) 2014 csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedairaq_Web.pdf Al-Qaeda in Iraq by M. J. Kirdar

2“The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics” Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Seventh Edition Edition (January 16, 2009).

3“Syria's Assad accused of boosting Al-Qaeda with Secret Oil Deals.” Ruth Sherlock, in Instanbul and Richard Spencer for www.telegraph.co.uk

4Dabiq issue 1 “The Return of Khalafi” - July 6^th, 2014

5“C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian Rebels.” Mark Mazzetti (c) New York Times, 10/14/2014

6“Problems of Enforcement and Vulnerability” by Barbara Walter. “The Use of Force.” Edited by Robert Art.

7“Problems of Enforcement and Vulnerability” Barbara Walter

8“From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing” Christopher Layne – The Use of Force

9“From Preponderance to Offhore Balancing.” by Christopher Layne

10“Ending the Drug War” The London School of Economics Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy.

11“The Strategy of Selective Engagement” by Robert J. Art from “The Use of Force.”<> indicate my alterations to his list of goals.

12“The Future of American Power,” by Joseph Nye, Jr. “Masters in International Relations (c) Council for International Relations

13“America's Imperial Ambition,” by G. John Ikenberry from “The Use of Force”

14“The Cuban Missile Crisis” by Graham Allison from CFR's Masters in International Relations.

15“God and Caesar in America: in Why Mixing Religion and Politics Is Bad for Both” by David E. Campbell and Robert D. Putnam.