Wednesday, November 5, 2014

Winning the Peace in Afghanistan


Winning in Afghanistan

Afghanistan, cannot and should not be viewed as a loss and the United States of America should not be in any type of race for the exits. Al-Qaeda planned its 9/11 attacks with the cover of the Taliban and in retaliation the United States armed forces were able to win a wide array of battles that culminated in the death of Osama Bin Laden. While Afghanistan, may not be a prize piece of territority, it is a war that the United States of America and its allies need to see through to Victory and beyond. We have to learn from the mistakes of our pre-mature departure in Iraq, for if we leave Afghanistan to the forces that be the Taliban will re-emerge in the Eastern part of the country and threaten to undo the hard fought gains of the Afghani people. I recommend erring on the side of force, with around 15,000 troops stationed there through 2016 and a plan to keep 7-10,000 troops their indefinately. Strategically in the heart of the Middle East, airfields in Afghanistan provide a means of allied forces efffectively projecting strength on Iran and Pakistan, two neccessities in light of Pakistan nuclear arsenal and Iran's continued nuclear program. The presence of significant airbases eases our allied ability to protect Kabul from attack and guarantee peace between competing ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, Uzbeck, Krygs and Pashtuns as well as the elected government and the ousted Taliban. Vital to underminning the potential for the Taliban's reemergence is credible pressure on Pakistan's ISI to cease all support for the Taliban. The USA has significant leverage to do so by making it clear that if Pakistan continues to fund the Taliban, that aid will be suspended, the Afghani Taliban will be designated as an international terrorist group and Pakistan will be designated as a state-sponsor of terror. The US needs to be willing to use these diplomatic levergages to protect its ally, Afghanistan.

There is hope, however, that the Taliban may not have substanital political aspirations and be willing not to interfere with the Kabul government. Recent actions are a show of force, but should not necessarily be interpreted as a determination to take power. Understandibly they will want to make sure that they have safe travel, freedom to practice their religion and access to whatever tribal lands are in their past. The interests of peace, present such as reasonable reconcilitory concessions. It is important to note, that we entered into war with Al-Qaeda, and they were routed out of Afghanistan, the Taliban, was a political entity providing Al-Qaeda cover, that we displaced. Non-interference with government operations such as education, as well as other economic activities is a pre-requisite to tolerance for their remedial presence in some parts of Eastern Afghanistan. Attacks on the Afghani Military or Allied operations will continue to be met with compelling force.

As the US plans for its residual force it needs to better focus its presence into larger military bases better capable of projecting US power to protect broader regional security interests such as countering nuclear proliferation. It is important that these bases are capable of providing for their security and that special forces operations are used sparingly and only as necessary, with coordination from a designee of the Ashraf Gani government. With substantially less visable US presence, it is hopeful that calm can come across the country and economic improvements can begin. The model for prosperity has to come from the successes in the 70s prior to the Russian invasion and be centered around the success of the Rural marketplace. The Kabul govenrment has to resist the tempation for excessive centralized control, instead providing material support to tribal leaders as they administer education, lead infrastructure projects and cooridnate security for trade, the marketplace and travel. Setting the right expectation is important. Kabul may have the potential to become an increasingly cosmopolitan and modern metropolis, but the countryside is likely to continue to be conservative, religious and protective of their autonomy.

40% of the current students benefiting from the expanded education system are woman, which is a tremendous stride towards modernity. Providing for their security needs to be a priority for the Afghani Military and their coordination with the US. Creating an education curriculum that sharpens minds without insulting their more devout religious sensibilities can facilitate a more harmonious transition to independence. It is important not to overlook the development of basic economic services, such as autoshops and mechanics. The US could potentially export appliances and rural equiptment, fund it with poppy cultivation grown by non-Taliban farmers and then direct those profits towards economic diversification that provides for the broader sustainence and comforts of the people. Gradual, sustainable development, interwoven with the fabric of their tribal society is the key to its embrace and acceptance. I contend, that it is better to allow for the availability of Sharian financial products directly to land owners and merhcants than for massive and extended funding for the government itself, as such distorts markets and ends up underminning the self-sufficiency of an uncompetitive agrarian marketplace. There will be some need for outside donations from the international community however, to facilitate access to education, pursue engineering projects and continued training and support for security forces.

This essay was largely motivated by “The Good War? What Went Wrong in Afghanistan-and How to Make it Right” by Peter Tomsen.       

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