Alexander the Great to George Bush and Back

Alexander the Great to George Bush and Back

    The Government of the United States is in peril for structural reasons. The mortgage crisese leading to the great recession and the issues in containing Islamist terrorism exemplifly this reality. The Bush junta followed the model of an impussive firm where control was consolitdated in a few individuals very close to the president, it reacted according to self-interest and to biases reinforced by the missions of the corporations these individuals worked for. Coming from the military, security and energy sectors, the 9/11 attacks became impetus for massive increases of spending and risky expansive measures focused on their procurement. 9/11 became a selling point to expand military spending, to invest in hi-tech tools developed by their friend's companies and the beginning of an expanisve campaign to dominate the energy resources of the Middle East before Russia or China were strong enough to move into the region. Their realpolitic thinking was at odds with that of our allies and prompted our adversaries to adopt more aggressive realpolitic posturing. While Iran and Russia collaborated with the US on Afganistan, once in Iraq, Iran saw an aggressive US strategy surrounding them in a longer term effort to ferment regime change, as a result, Iran's intelligence agencies focused on bogging the US down in Iraq, providing material and technical assistance to Sunni insurgents. Iran's leadership new that bloody headlines and a costly occupation would deflate US opptimism in a positive outcome resulting from an invasion of Iran, even though the victims of the violence were often Shi'ites and a Shi'ite dominated regime that would move Iraq closer to Iran politically.

    While Rumsfeld invested much energy into restructuring the US military away from a force greared towards deterring Russian advance and into one able to overwhelm smaller military forces quickly; the importance of large armies and tanks proved pertinent in the aftermath of warfighting. Airstrikes on Anbar is about as effective as pouring water on a griese fire, tanks are needed to hold the network of roads ISIS travels and troops to clear and hold territories. The US military; however, has been cumbersome in its ability to adapt to new tactics and a new reality. Rumsfeld should have forsaw the dangers of digital cameras and the internet's ability to broadcast US actions, therefore taking increasingly strict measures surrounding the useage of such. Had the Abu Ghraib scandal never occurred, the Insurgency never would have found momentum. The idea of the US replacing Saddam as their oppressor, with video images of humiliating treatment was the Boston Masacre Al-Qaeda's propagandists needed to recruit resistance. The swollen budgets following 9/11 emboldened military planners and generals to become spoiled, envisioning plans that the US public was unwilling to pay for. They spent lavishly to win short-term loyalty from the occupied populaces without enough understading or focus on developing sustainable economies. These wars were to be magically repaid by Iraqi oil reserves, but instead these same characters refused to put back into the treasury and send out to the populace its share of the winnings, instead pouring resources into the creation of Iraqi security forces that proved incompetent, losing their weapons to the Islamic State. The stagnant nature of the DoD's bureacracy is severly hampering our ability to address an enemy that adapts quickly, takes full advantage of the internet and modern technologies to recruit, propagandize and disrupt the objectives of the US and its allies in the region. Politics and neccessities of winning elections to stay in power in Washington distracts our senate, congress and administration from taking the actions necessary to integrate new technologies, tactics, operations and strategies into action, by relectant DoD professional who prefer measures they have already tested or practiced in battle.

    When Barack Obama was on vacation as crisis was unfolding, the US really began to become a headless giant. A DoD that has lost trust in Barack Obama combined with varying agencies with varying goals continuing about their missions makes the headless giant model relevent. This largely has to do with the fact that Barack Obama was a Senator, a lawmaker, not an administrator or commander by experience. He finds more rapid rewards from serving as spokesmen, or attorney for the US than he does by getting in the control room and acting as commander and chief. As a result, his bureacracy has drifted, talk of untethered warfighting would never have occurred or been considered in other times. I suggest that this has less to do with Barack Obama, than the way his enemies within have depicted him, never-the-less commitment to a working strategy and closer administrative oversight measuring results beyond number of kills, is going to dramatically improve our efforts in the middle east. Let's be clear that our efforts to build secuirty forces have not been of much help in battle. Aside from the Pesh Merga, these individuals are fighting for money and the history of success for soldier's of fortune is very low. They may be tactically competent but their interest is in doing their job and going home to collect a check, meaning conflicts with tough foes determined on defending their homes at all costs will create a disadvantage. As the Roman Empire increasingly employed Germanic tribes and they achieved higher positions in the military, the Empire weakened as their loyalty was not to the Roman System of Values. The same occurred when the British Empire lost control of the American colonies, the Hessian fighters employed in the conflict were technically proficient and professional, but cared more about survival than victory.

     The US needs to be looking to reach economic benchmarks at home and abroad, an improved economic situation, while aggressively making the case that the economic, security and political situation is improving as democracy, capitalism and the rule of law are brought into play. Our base of support can grow if the US reaches beyond the interests of the DoD and includes the UN in organizing extensive humanitarian relief efforts that pull young men in the areas of interest away from the fight while undercutting the grievences prompting the conflict. The UN however, needs significant support from the US military to achieve its mission, and broader objectives to defeat the enemy may require the US and our allies militaries to do more than the UN security council approves. The UN cannot become a global communist organization or a forum for lambasting rivals, it needs to be a competent means of providing humanitarian relief in crisis without sabatoging local markets in the areas of crisis. Sun Szu recommends purchasing goods from the local populace as a means of coopting the locals. This worked for England when landed in the US during the war of 1812. The US and UN can achieve this by increasing expenditures on local labor and product, then phasing out humanitarian relief with an interim period where it curbs charity, but strongly encourages and invests in marketization; working to balance the often conflicting needs of regional self-sufficiency and global integration as the crisis subsides. The causes of conflict in the Arab spring, in Syria and in Anbar province are as much economical as anything else. The fact that the rhetoric of the resistance morphed into politicized Islam, does not mean that the key to pacification is the acceptance of the Terrorist State lead by Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi; however, pushing for an Islamic State lead by someone else, more acceptable to regional governments may work and be acceptable to all parties. Criminals and terrorists can just as easily be brought to justice under Sharian Law as Napoleonic or Common Law, and banks can structure Sharian compliant products as easily as they can sell mortgages and bonds. Capitalism can be adapted to comply with Sharian Law in the areas where the populaiton wants it and in ways that improve the quality of life for the individuals living under it. The thriving metropolis of Dubai is a case and point. Democracy, as envisioned by western liberals is not the governing solution we are looking for in the regions of the Middle East. We have tried this route and it has failed. Let's move on and get to work restoring order, markets and meritocracy with the lessons of Alexander the Great's successes in mind. Alexander the Great was successful because when he took territories across the Middle East he did not force his newly adopted subjects to embrace Greek customs, instead he appointed magistrate governors who kept or adopted the customonial rules and ceremonies of the regions' traditional leaders.