Objectives and Strategy to subdue the Islamic State in Levant

Objectives and Strategy to subdue the Islamic State in Levant

The United States of America and our Allies cannot continue appease the Islamic State in Levant and needs to take decisive action to prevent its advance. While Barack Obama has authorized airstrikes, humanitarian aid drops and outlined our military objectives as Protecting American Citizens, Providing Advice and Support for Iraqi Forces and joining with international partners to provide humanitarian aid, the situation on the ground necessitates more extensive actions and the combination of our air force, special forces and intelligence agencies could bolster the capabilities of the Kurdish Pesh Merga, Iraqi Security Forces and former forces of the Sunni Awakening to establish humanitarian aid corridors, to secure and defend contested cities from ISIL advances, contain ISIL in a narrowing zone of influence within Anbar province and begin efforts to retake cities, including Iraq’s second largest city Mosul, to provide zones within Anbar for Sunnis loyal to the Iraqi Unity Government looking to escape ISIS to regroup.  The US needs to closely monitor flights to and from the region and effectively identify outside agitators entering in to the conflict zone, particularly from Syria, but also Chechnya and other regions such as Algeria and Libya.   There needs to be a particularly close eye on those individuals with US or European Visas flying to these zones to take part in the fighting, as they pose an extra-ordinary risk to national security that the combined efforts of the NSA, FBI, Homeland Security, Interpol, Mi5 and other respective agencies are going to need to aggressively pursue, with coordinated transmissions of suspect lists and information from the CIA and Mi6 operating oversees in Iraq. 

Protecting American Citizens in Iraq requires a combination of ready air units and highly trained security forces to defend not only our embassies, but also our other positions throughout Iraq, including our extensive business holdings.  A tit-for-tat approach is not going to be an effective strategy, the US needs to be working to facilitate transition in Baghdad to a competent unity government that will direct Iraqi security forces to help achieve these ends, while allowing for the necessary outside competence to keep their presence secure. The appointment of Haidar al-Abadi is a start, but more needs to be done to be sure that Al-Malaki turns over power and doesn’t mount efforts to ferment a coup d’état. The Kurdish Pesh Merga, are the most competent and trust worthy military partner within Iraq and their proximity to Anbar province make them the necessary northern front against ISIL.  US, British, French or other NATO partner air cover, is going to ease their ability to clear contested towns as heavier weapons capable of piercing bullet proof Humvees are provided.  Heavy artillery is going to be crucial to holding these towns as they are cleared, along with other perimeter guaranteeing devices that exclude the usage of landmines.   These clearing operations are going to be dangerous, and part of the strategy is to clear paths into contested towns to get injured or vulnerable civilians out, and the necessary combinations of food, medicine and military support in.   The US and our allies are going to need to maintain some type of permanent air bases in the Kurdish controls areas, behind the front, but in proximity to the contested zones.   Boosting the capabilities of the Kurds and Yazidi’s to defend Irbil and other contested cities is the necessary first step as humanitarian support needs to continue in our effort to halt continued acts of iconoclast and genocide by ISIL.

Providing Advice and Support for Iraqi forces is going to demand enough communications tools, weapons and money to recruit and sustain the forces necessary to push back against a well-funded, brutal and tactically clever foe in ISIL.  Holding Erbil is the top priority, but retaking Mosul will solidify the perception of shifting momentum and undo ISIL’s most prominent accomplishment to date.  Pressuring Al-Malaki to hand over power is going to be crucial to more permanent success, something that Al-Sistani and the Shi’ite clerics can have positive roles in facilitating.  Iraq needs more competent and less sectarian leadership if it wishes to retain any of hope of remaining a single country, even if it ultimately needs to concede increasing degrees of autonomy to the Kurdish, Sunni and Shi’ite states respectively while protecting long-established minority populations living within each of these three sub-states.  The Anbar province spiraled out of control as dissatisfied Sunnis were deprived of the pay promised by Al-Malaki for their support in the Sunni Awakening to oust Al-Qaeda, the lack of pay and formalized incorporation into Iraq’s security apparatus made room for ISIL to emerge as it spilled over from the civil war in neighboring Syria.  With a unity government formed in Baghdad, the more formalized Iraqi army can begin retaking ground by marching west from Baghdad, city by city.  Tensions between Sunnis and Shi’ites are going to be high, however, and as these cities are liberated from ISIL’s grip, their needs to be clear and competently managed efforts to reintegrate those populations back into Iraq, providing them humanitarian relief, but also jobs to encourage a quicker return to normalcy.  Some of the young men may need to be drafted into the Iraqi military with better regimented discipline to keep them from abandoning their posts and re-joining their ISIL insurgents.  

Working with International Partners to provide humanitarian aid needs to go beyond simply dropping food, water and medicine from high above.  As Iraqi Security forces and Pesh Merga pull themselves together to begin taking back territory, there is going to be a clear need to remove all outside agitators for any hope of reconciliation to occur.  This may require actions that disgust international observers as Iraq lacks the means to conduct traditional immigration enforcement and extradition procedures, particularly when foreign fighters have flocked to the region and across borders in large numbers.  For the Iraqi’s within ISIL, there is also going to need to be sweeping amnesty for many of those forced into the ranks of ISIS by fear or desperation if they surrender on the battle field or come to some sort of political/diplomatic solution with Baghdad.   In the aftermath there is going to need to be extensive programs geared towards reconciling religious and political differences, to create understanding and a sense of nationalism that acknowledges past grievances of the past while resetting Shi’ite/ Sunni relations in Iraq.  The Kurds have the best chance of arbitrating these competing ethnic groups but both the Shi’ites and Sunnis will have to grant increased autonomy as it relates to their oil proceeds if they hope to keep the Kurds from seeking official independence.  The humanitarian relief provided by the international community needs to extend beyond simply meeting immediate food and medical needs but focus on developing a self-sustaining market place and economy that provides affordable goods and services, along with rewarding jobs.

The Islamic State of Levant is not some regional issue that the United States and International community can ignore, its fundamental belief in the emergence of a Caliphate, its strict enforcement of Sharia Law along with expansive and intolerant militant agenda determine that left as is the Islamic State of Levant would not only become a terror state pressing for sovereignty in Anbar province, but the global hub for terrorist recruitment, training, planning and operations around the world.  The leadership of ISIL has made it very clear that they are seeking military actions, specifically, in New York, that they are watching, and it is obvious that ISIL not only has sympathizers, but active cells in the US, across Europe, throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  ISIL has a hardline Islamist idea, that even though ISIL has broken from Al-Qaeda’s chain of command, that it shares with not only Al-Qaeda but also terror groups such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Ansar Al-Sharia and the Al-Nursa brigade.  The numerous other active Islamist groups share an idea that even many moderate Muslims share, and so with a common end and only a variance in means, how can the west hope to prevent that end.  The reality is, that we may not be able to, that at some point we may need to recognize a caliphate, but it cannot be Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, it has to be one willing to issue authoritative and overriding fatwas to end the violence, emphasize commonalities amongst the great monotheistic faiths, protect minority groups and make peace with regional governments, Israel and the West while modernizing their interpretations of Sharia law to accommodate contemporary notions of human rights and expectations of democracy.   A Caliphate that would do such, would be a Caliphate in the graces of God, and could perhaps stabilize a region defined by destructive ethnic, religious and civil strife.  Any lasting peace resolution in Iraq is going to require more than simply acknowledging a new prime minister in Baghdad, it is going to require convincing ISIL and the followers of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi that there is a more a worthy Caliphate- one willing to assume a role similar to the Pope’s today, whose role is more ceremonial and whose leadership is focused more on the spiritual than political.