Saving America from Nazism and the Earth from Communism

Saving America from Nazism and the Earth from Communism 

   As an avid historian and professionally trained political scientist, realist strategic considerations and the applicability of historical lessons always take precedent in my recommendations. As I understand more about the IA world, I recognize the reality that in my independence I have traversed a far wider range of roles than traditional bureacratic norms would entail. Being so well rounded has encouraged and facilitated extensive degrees of independence. By developing new means of technological monitoring, identifying valued and reliable accademic and media related sources, fusing a broad based faculty of knowledge, while building wide reaching networks, I have facilitated the development of a nuanced and new approach to intelligence that can be valuable in closing the gap between IC agencies and homeland security, helping to connect the dots between intelligence and policy making. While seniority within the ranks of the Intelligence Community rightfully encourages a tighter adhearence to standard rules, protocols and time-tested procedures of intelligence, the principal/agent relationship offers younger agents the opportunity to be more experimental, to take greater risks and develop newer methodologies and approaches relating to the intersect of intelligence and policy maker, at least according to the public administration department. Looking at past US intelligence failures, most have stemmed around issues relating to group-think, politcal or bureacratic considerations and an excessively limited range of acceptable perspectives or opinons and assesments to be formulated. In order to more effectively connect the intelligence community to the policy community, the intelligence community needs to recruit more open-source specialists, exercise critical thinking skills, retain a better balance of generalists and specialists, encourage a wider multitude of ideas similar to the tenth man role in Israeli intelligence (or what the text book refers to as the Devil's Advocate) and continually prioritize work on the most critical issues of the day.

    From the descriptions of what goes on inside the NSA and in the CIA headquarters, an obvious problem exists in compartmetalization. While compartmentalization is a safe-guard against intelligence breaches, broader meritocratic transparency is a safe-guard against bad decisions and agenda supporting intelligence creation. Institutionalizing appropriately trained open-source experts, reduces the tunnel vision that can result from tightly controlled Intelligence Analasis. With youtube and so much user involved media, one can better monitor what is actually happening more closely, understand the attitudes or perspectives of various populaces and make more careful considerations when formulating assessments relating to policy. Using the internet to cull a broader range of reporting, foreign and domestic, combined with a closer monitoring of foreign governments who have formal twitter accounts and websites that they use for strategic messaging all facilitate a broader intellectual understanding of world events. Think-tanks and policy tanks, leading experts in international relations and foreign policy strategy, become priceless assets. Engaging with the populace, getting out in the field, and meeting with or interacting, listening to the issues they are facing or perspectives that are trending is vital to modern intelligence assessments. Identifying the Psyops and staying focused on the moves of the movers and shakers is crucial. The most recent Ebola scare was a pathetic ploy, high rates of Auto Immune disorders in Liberia lead to high death rates, America has far lower risks for such and it was obvious that the media was being directed to cover the story to divert attention from the very real problems surrounding Operation Inherent Resolve. These types of ploys create serious negative reactions from a voting and tax paying public increasingly mistrustful of the media and our govenrment. If the media would stop trying to direct public opinion and instead focus on fostering a robust, informed national dialogue than our representatives could be held to a higher standard of policy formulations and as a result, produce a stronger role for Intelligence Analysts since their impartial, scientifically accurate role would be welcomed and highly valued.

    Increasingly, even America's military and intelligence agencies needs to think more and more like a marketing firm than a govenrment, it needs to consider how America is being branded around the world, perhaps before all else if it wishes to grow its economy, maintain its leadership position and increase the security of our citizenry. It cannot hope to maintain leadership by way of psyops and propaganda, instead our government needs to learn to set the realistic expectations, tell the truth to its citizens and deliver. For this reason, the Intelligence Analysts ability to make accurate assessments is increasingly important. Providing IA with the tools, and encouraging them not to produce the product the buyer wants, but emphasizing accuracy, precision and relavance is key. One means of reducing tunnel vision and increasing accuracy is to tap into a select range of open-sources. Stephen C. Mercado, rightly identifies, “the revolution in information technology, commerce, and politics since the Cold War's end is only making open sources more accessible, ubiquitous and valueable.” There is need for more research on how open source can be effectively infused with HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT to help produce the more nuanced and sophisticated assessments necessary to craft effectively administratable policy in an increasingly complex world. As a matter of personal practice, I read the CFR daily briefings, visit the brooking institute, the cato institute, the economist, the washington post, the new york times, bloomberg in addition to a number of key international security related issues that I monitor via a customized Google news tab. I stack my bible with the portable machiavelli and Robert J. Art's “The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics,” while prefering to watch pertinant documentries over sports or sitcoms. I replaced gangster movies with an ever-ready stream of either historically accurate films, war films or other series and flims relating to the various government agencies. I charted out all of the various govenrment agencies so that as events break, I could practice considering what directives I would be making as a resposne.

      I've branched out into Public Administration, studying Public Administrative Theory under the direction of an individual raised in the Sunni system who has done extensive research looking at how the Hezbollah's success has stemmed from its ability to run a number of successful charities where the official government has failed. The Islamic State found early success under a simple formula of giving old Ba'athist technocrats their old jobs back, divesting money from the Capital and sending it instead to the municipal councils focused on restoring basic services such as energy, hospital care and water, while ousting the national security forces which were percieved as violently oppressive agents of a rival ethnic and religious group. While the actions against the Yahzeda's and rhetoric of expanse required response, argueably one could have undercut some of the violence by facilitating transition into the dissolution of Iraq and Syria into its more natural ethnic and religious sect based states. A reasonable compromise can be struck between the various parties, the matter of peace, then rests on finding mechanisms of guaranteeing those terms so the various actors in the conflict can accept a cease fire. As I've been saying since the run up to the bombing campain against the Islamic State, that the actions are equivalent to pooring water on a griese fire, the rational policy choices would have been to either suffocate the fire or to contain it and allow it to burn itself out. If I am the policy maker, than I want my Intelligence Analysts to provide their expert opinions in easily digestible and logical form, with clear and compelling rhetorical arguments backed by science and imperical evidence, but also considered against common wisdom. What I do not want, is works looking to reinforce an ideology or advance special interests. Ultimately, the government should be held to the same standards of fraud and deceptive marketing practices as any other marketing firm.

    I spend long hours in the library studying great generals, great kings, effective presidents in an effort to understand the makings of greatness. I always look to get into the minds of key players, to anticipate their next move and game out what they may do as I plot my course. Looking to monitor the implemention of policy, I sought to develop more advanced open source methodologies, or at least routines, and when I am at my computer, I have simultaneously put a web-tab for the DOJ, DHS, CIA, State Department, FBI, Governor, County, Mayor, Whitehouse.gov, Senate, Congress, Attorney General, NY times, Washington Post, Jerusalem Post, Iranian website, Saudi govenrment sight, Qatari sight, Bahrain Site, Syrian Site, Iraqi Sight, Turkish News, Egptian News and Libyan news, and monitor them in live time, moving from tab to tab to see the effects of policy. I look for blogs, view jihadist propaganda, read the blogs of more intelligent witnesses to events on the ground, review battlefield tapes, study formations, compare tactics, study strategy fervently and look upon the world as a chess board, angling for allied advantage. I read the diplomatic meetings between Qataris and Iranian govenrment for example, and even in their public statements it is amazing how much valueable intel you can pull. I have my girlfriend translate the papers from mexico city, and I agree with Mercado, who strongly recommends “more language officers, organizing an OSINT fleet, exploiting private sector technologies,” but he misses out on the evolving styles of management and organization that cultivates the best productivity from the brightest minds. When I meet someone, I ask their country of origin, their work, their studies, their culture, discuss politics and try to find ways to help. The key is to gleam the best work of the best, to internalize and organically infuse it together to recognzie the patterns and trends predictive of what will come tomorrow and to position to stay ahead, maintaining differentiation without ever sacrificing quality for the sake of equality or conformity.

     Critical thinking is even more important than analtyic thinking. Understanding the relationship between two variables is a very small component of intelligence. I recommend priortizing the issues that intersect between those that are most important and those that are simplest to solve. Doing such will create a reality where you are continually solving important issues successfully and therefore, increasing one's value to the policy maker. Defeating the Islamic State is difficult, minimalizing its threat to Arabian government's is easier. Securing cooperation from oil rich regimes with small militaries by providing security agreements and technical assistance in the fight against terrorism is easier than invading heavily armed countries with limited self-sustaining economic prospects. Investing resources in struggles where clearly beneficial outcomes can easily be produced, is better than investing resources in struggles where long and hard fights will produce outcomes lacking a clear benefit to our republic. Bolstering military presence to hold ground, is easier than re-taking ground. Opening and securing markets is easier than democratization. Providing law and order in line with custom, tradition and religion is easier than imposing western notions of law. Credible deterent strategies are often easier than preventitive strategies. Building functional municipalities is easier than building functional nations, providing financial resources to local managers discretion is easier than enforcing a tightly controlled set of objectives and means. Embracing diversity, encouraging responsibility and pushing economic improvements is easier than altering ideologies, changing behaviors and forcing acceptance of state-centered conceptions of law and authority. Convincing people to stop fighting and accepting agreeable terms, is easier than forcing them to fight on to total victory and unconditional surrender. Dividing and creating balance, is easier than conquering and dominating. Carrying on tradition, is easier than change.

      Phase VI planning in the run up to the second Iraq war was heavy on ideology but short on ciritical thinking. The result was an insurgency that drained our treasury. COIN was as fine a means of combatting the insurgency as any, but ignored the wisdom of avoiding trying to fight one all together. Asking why your agency or department is working so hard to maintain a specific social construct is a pertinent critical question to ask? This is not to say that you should dismiss intelligence as simply a construct devoid of fact or without the need of attention. I think it is safe to conclude, however, that the pressures on the intelligence community in the run up to the Iraq war serve as a cautionary tale about the problems that can result, when expectations of a specific consistent intelligent result are levied on the Intelligence Community. Ultimately, however, hind sight is twenty-twenty, with known mistakes made, Saddam was still a threat, had chemical weapons and the aftermath of US departure has shown that Sunni Ba'athists are quite capable and willing to work with radical jihadists. David T. Moore has an exceptional book on the importance of Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analasis. His use of case studies, illustration of critical thinking failures and successful negotiating tactics relating to intelligence is incredible. Critical reviews of case studies and data-sets are important mental excercises that any IA needs to vigorously seek out and consume. Keep your mind sharp, neuroplasticity, game playing and other more basic faculties such as science, math, literature and writing augment logical reasoning, analytic reasoning and the criticial thinking necessary for success in the Intelligence Community. Basic common sense never hurt either.

      Retaining a better balance of generalists and specialists is important, there is a need for well-rounded broad based experts, and there is a need for individuals with narrow but meritocratically resolute authority on specific subjects, countries, groups or regions. Balancing the intelligence community with combinations of both, is the surest means of preventing excessive group-think and intelligence errors. Devising management strategies and work spaces that encourage greater amounts of interaction and collaboration will advance more nuanced and sound reasoning in Intelligence Analasis. A study of management strategies at successful private sector companies such as Google can help us. It is important that the work flow of Intelligence Analaysts is in part dedicated to analytic questions in an area of expertise; however, it also needs to be balanced by other intellectual activities and broader context of current events, cultural studies, strategic studies, science, historical studies and comparative politics. A more diverse aray of methodologies and requirements to encourage analysts to look at a more diverse aray of perspectives would also be appropriate. There may be need to encourage a wider range of intelligence product types.  Opinions on policy may not be an intelligence analyst or intelligence managers purview, but an honest answer to a direct question may be all the policy maker needs from his intelligence analysts. Having looked at the government's direct disseminations closely and comparing them to the work from leading international relations experts and government focused academic researchers at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Georgetown University, Stanford, Harvard, Cambridge and Oxford. UC Berkley and UCLA are fine institutions, but be weary of the communist and socialist influence. Increasingly, economics needs to be the vital faculty of intelligence analysis, particularly assessments as to how different policies, leaders or events will impact the volume of global trade and health of markets.

     Personally, managed multiple advocacy is an engraved component of my ethos, studying the mistakes by Kennedy in the run up to the Vietnam war and looking at some of the mistakes in the Bush-Cheney Administration, this is neccessary moving forward and there is a need to vigorously promote the “perfect maket of ideas in the manner that John Stuart Mill believed made liberalism conducive to the emergence of truth,” even if at times, they conflict with broader strategy agendas and previosly intended long term plans that the spontaneity of history has redirected. Effective command is a higher priority than control, and effective command often requires altering the course and changing direction. Richard K. Betts uses the intelligence failures in the run-up to the 1973 war to position a reconmendation “to institutionalizing dissent by assigning to someone the job of articulating apparently ridiculous interpretations to ensure that they are forced into consideration.” I like this idea and would enjoy taking the position. Working as a safe-guard against group think, involving the tenth man approach, could prevent major events from occuring without anticipation and contingency planning. For example, Is General Xi's consolidations of power and the public proclomations of allegiance from some 53 senior military officials (“China's Imperial President” by Elizabeth C. Economy) signs of his control over China, or preparations for imperial expansion? What if Barack Obama is acting as their Manchurian Candidate? What if there is coup by Nazi influenced general? How can the United States prevent communist pressures at local levels and nationalist pressures at the federal level from squeezing the American Middle Class into revolt? Are pressures from Gulf states to get US support for an invasion of Syria and to arm rebel groups in Jordan a coordinated trap to exhaust US resources before turning their attention to an invasion of Israel? What if Mexico fell to communists? What if Russia coordinates a wide spread betrayal of America? What if nuclear deterrence no longer held, because regimes called each other's bluffs? What if a country called a bluff incorrectly? Could a convincing scientific discovery proving creationalism become a black swan event? Someone should be vigorously exploring these scenarios and someone should be exploring what strategically, operationally and tactically the United States could do in response. Betts contends that such an IA role could become Sophist, and be seen as “one crying wolf,” but clearly there is need for increased “Team B” criticisms. Betts concedes, “the intermittent designation of devil's advocates in periods of crisis, when the possiblity of diaster is greater than usual.” Interestingly, Betts identifies that “the most realistic strategy for improvement would be to have intelligence professionals anticipate the cognitive barriers to decision makers' utilization of their products.” How to go about doing such, and defining ethical barriers to such insights is the greater challenge.

     By recruiting more open-source specialists, strengthening critical thinking skills, retaining a better balance of generalists and specialists, encouraging a wider multitude of ideas or multiple advocacy and continually dedicating time in each day to the most critical current policy related issues of the day, the intelligence community can more effectively connect the intelligence community to the policy community. More than anything, however, I believe that the intelligence community needs to follow through on its recruitment of more creative minds. Doing such, requires making resources to be made available and understanding that they need to be managed very differently for they are accustomed to being in low supply and high demand, we are not of the same discpline of the military and cannot reasonably be expected to conform to a uniform set of protocols or such strict measures of discpline. Think-tanks and our text books have spoken regularly about the importance of recruiting more creative minds, and with an extensive career in music, film and marketing to augment my academic experience and acumen, giving the past three years of what would be most profitable time in entertainment, I have been troubled by the lack of consideration or accomadation for the variance such powerful minds demand. There's recruitment, but no sensible means of facilitating follow-through for the acquisition of the fill the blank-space types so heroic in the oppenheimer project and at bletchey park, for we are not blank slates capable of traditional military style indoctrination. The intelligence community needs to bring in a wider range and more diverse range of faculty expertise, beyond military to be sure that IA is not simply a means of advancing bureacratic interests. Unanimous consensus may make a result seem scientific, but it also can undermine the foresight of valuable varying perspectives taking a broader set of variables and goals into account. For the part of policy makers, they need to do a better job at delegating fund raising tasks and be provided larger amounts of resources for imperical and qualitative based policy reviews so that they are free to focus on doing the jobs they were elected to perform. Part of IA work in the future, should be monitoring the affects of policies. Working for government, this should be the most basic analytic function of government intelligence. One way to improve impartiality for intelligence analysts, and to encourage them is to provide life-long positions similar to Judges, greater long-term financial security for policy makers, and longer-term and less restrictive employment contracts for Intelligence Analysts. For the policy makers, visible positioning in a court, similar to how former royal courts were assembled, would be of tremendous value in a world where data is transmitted so quickly that out of sight, is often out of mind and bureacratization creates compartmentalization and distance, often detrimental to the formation of valuable and transparent working relationships that provide a larger context from which Intelligence Assessments can be presented. Imagine if all key policy makers had visible regional intelligence experts and experts in the more pertinent fields relating to govenrnment, before him or her at all times, assembled in a court with a ready flow of business professionals and foreign dignataries. Successful rulers understood this reality and kept the best and brightest in their courts at all times. Just because we are a Representative Republic, is no reason that our elected representatives should not have functional courts modeled after the best european royal courts in lieu of the common bureacratic business style offices prevelent today. I believe such will awaken more ingenuitive leadership, better policy decisions and stronger relationships between policy makers and Intelligence Analysts. The surest way to improve homeland security is a simple matter of making sure that everyone has a reliable flow of hard currency, property, capital and privacy and then trusting us to know best how to manage our time and spend it. Stress, despair and desperation are the causes of nearly all homeland security risks. It's not so much dots, but the supply lines that need connecting. My recommendation, revert to the wisdom of Adam Smith's “Wealth of Nations” and laissez-faire.

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