Policy Considerations for Iraq, in light of Iraq's second largest city, Mosul's Fall to the Islamic State of Iraq in Levant (ISIS).

June 10^th, 2014

Policy Considerations for Iraq, in light of Mosul's Fall

    If the President has prided himself on ending an era of warfare, he needs to act decisively to avoid his legacy being that of the era where the center of global power shifts from Western Allies to Al-Qaeda and their affiliates of the Islamic world. If you believe, that its not possible for your grandchildren to be Muslims putting their head to ground five times a day by threat of beheading, then good for you. I prefer not live in a world of fantastic fantasies. At the current trajectory of events; this is not an impossibility. I agree, that the Iraq war was a foolhardy military adventure and while it is certainly true that the removal of Saddam Huessein facilitated the unearthing of monstrosities such as ISIS, one also must contend, that by breaking the state, America shares some responsibility for being sure that its three parts continue to function and avoid becoming terrorist safe havens. Unfortunately, what we have seen in Fallujah, Mosul and the surrounding Anbar province is nothing short of a terrorist land-grab that will continue to expand as a tumor throughout a healthy body if it is not aggressively and decisively defeated. These issues were created by the chaos of Syria and Iranian domination of the region as Shi'ites took power in Iraq. What is at stake, that even only a periphery study of Western Civilization reveals, is whether or not the Persian Empire will dominate the Middle East or whether it will be shared amongst the various groups in a way that prevents the Rise of Empire and preserves the Western allied dominance of Arabian monarchs. While I value democracy, its pilot trials during the Arab spring and previously in Gaza, have not faired well. Democracy has pre-requisites that the region largely lacks. I do believe, that Iraq is a country capable of democracy, and that the formation of effective representative governance is the future for Iraq, I simply feel that its is going to need to be largely confederated between the three primary states for any type of productive cohesion to occur.

       Al-Malaki is stuck in a decision where he must decide whether to double down on authoritarianism and risk escalating the ISIS recruitment from the minority Sunni Group accustomed to holding power in the country or grant extensive concessions to the Kurds and Sunni populace in an effort to preserve some degree of order and avoid an all out civil war. Undoubtedly, this risks an increase in popularity for the Supreme Islamic Council rivaling his position as the man with the most votes in Iraq, bringing with it a range of threats to Western interests as the radicalism of Sadr and close relations with Tehran spell a looming dominance of the region that will escalate tensions with the Arab League. At question still, is why the Iraqi Security forces were so quick to desert their positions? We're they outgunned? We're they outnumbered? Did the chain of command fail to provide the appropriate orders? What penalties are being held for desertion? How can the United States continue to justify providing Baghdad weapons to fight ISIS if at the first sign of siege from ISIS they surrender their posts and weapons to the enemy they were provided to fight? It wasn't a small Sunni village that fell, yesterday, it was the second largest city in Iraq. The Sunni Awakening that was so crucial to the defeat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq during the Surge, was squandered by the inability of Al-Malaki to follow threw on his promise to integrate the Sunni militias into the Iraqi security forces. Frighteningly, the ISIS is an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, lead by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that Al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri has disowned because the group's methods were too extreme.

         There are certainly options available; however, the best course of action is far from clear. Kurd's regional forces, who have a substantial ethnic presence in Mosul and the surrounding towns are certainly one option. Their security forces have shown themselves to be competent and to fight with a tighter cohesion. The Kurds have enjoyed their new found degrees of autonomy and have no interest in going back to the Sunni domination of the Ba'athist days. Their actions will provide leverage to negotiate further autonomy, with perhaps approval of their independently negotiated oil deal with Turkey a prize to be awarded by Baghdad. At this time, Al-Malaki needs to buy all the friends he can from his subjects. All of this will go against the wishes of Baghdad, a city with wide ethnic and religions differences and strong traditions of centralized command, making such sub-contracting of power a radical approach. That being said, releasing some control of the Sunni regions of Anbar to the right parties can also alleviate the draw of ISIS, but its clear that their may indeed be need for some outside military presence to regain control of the region.

          While the Americans are most certainly the most competent military force in the world, and the consequences of the premature withdrawal may be the moral of the story to be applied in Afghanistan; its worth the effort to form some formidable cooperating group of regional players to accomplish the task of quelling the ISIS lead revolt. The Saudi's are certainly an increasingly capable and well equipped military whose shared Sunni background may make them the liberating force of choice for the moderate Sunnis looking for a Sunni alternative to ISIS. Saudi Arabia can certainly increase its role in helping manage the region, something it aspires to do by pushing back and marginalize the ISIS and continuing to pull Anbar province into modernity. For the Saudi military to actively enter this region, as seemingly would be needed to combat the ISIS; however, would be a much more controversial proposal that the Iranian consultants to the Shi'ite leadership in Baghdad are unlikely to approve. The Saudi soldiers are also likely to have grievances about facing their ethnic kin and religious allies on the battlefield depending the actual sentiments of the Sunnis in Anbar. Without some sort of acceptance by Baghdad such actions could exasperate the regional Sunni/Shiite conflicts that have defined the history of the Middle East into an all out war.

            Baghdad very well may be able to declare the State of Emergency necessary to clamp down on the opposition in the ISIS, but this is also going to aggravate portions of the population. Insurgent groups in the past, have with some success, deliberately used attacks to prompt government crack downs with expectations that they could use the crack downs in propaganda to advance their cause. If al-Malaki's security forces are unwilling to hold their posts and use the weapons and training the USA provided them, then a State of Emergency is not going to be of much good and the declaration will only erode respect for the Bagdad based government. All of these realities are going to damage Al-Malaki's coalition, increasing the popularity of the more radical Shi'ite parties and ethnic based Sunni and Kurdish parties, predictively correlating with parliamentary gridlock and political impasse, rendering the Baghdad based Iraqi national government useless.

           Personally, I think Barack Obama has played the peacemaker effectively and appropriately, but the consequences of his peace making are starting to show, and its hard to argue that the security situation has improved by handing out olive branches. Let us not be fooled by Republican politics; however, this is in part the masterful political theater of Barack Obama, holding himself as the one to make every effort at peace while his Generals prepare for the deployment of overwhelming military force. I'm not one for allowing such problems to fester, the ISIS is a very real threat that if unchecked will continue to grow and extend its influence not only in the Middle East, but also into the capitals of Europe and even the United States, with no qualms about using devastating violence against infidel civilian targets. The Democratic Party needs to face this reality, setting aside their more dovish instincts to confront these threats seriously.

          In the most immediate term, I feel that the Kurdish forces are the best bet at handing the ISIS a few quick losses to slow their advance and cool their confidence, but believe it will take an imposed State of Emergency by Bagdad with support from regional partners beyond just Iran, but also Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar to effectively divert the Anbar regions popular action away from armed revolt. Bagdad can preserve some glory by taking credit publicly for directing a coalition of the various ethnic groups under the national flag to combat ISIS's black banners, as their wealthier neighbors provide financial resources and technical expertise in an effort to restore basic government services and pacify widespread animosity.

          Let us not forget that the US still has a presence of some 20,000 foreign service officers, and so some clandestine tactical teams and air support is certainly not out of the question. The burden is on Al-Malaki; however, to show the United States of America that he is a capable leader who can control his security forces in an effective way to address such security concerns without simply surrendering the weapons we provide to his government and relinquishing their control to our mutual enemies. America may now have the leverage to see Al-Malaki quietly sign a troop immunity agreement for nimble contingents of clandestine US forces, and should perhaps consider withholding any further support until such a document is signed.

       The final area that must be considered in this discussion is Syria. The ISIS is a direct by-product of the Syrian Civil War, where within ISIS has been proving itself to be among the more formidable active military forces, dividing the attention of friendly Sunni rebels in Syria away from Bashar Assad and forcing them instead to fight against ISIS and the Syrian military. Bashar Assad's unwillingness to hand over power to an interim government acceptable to the moderate rebel forces, has allowed for all of this to transpire. Bashar Assad and his boss in Tehran must make this situation, all the more uncomfortable. The horrific nature of the Syrian Civil war has further radicalized the population and now, as predicted, the conflict is spilling over into the surrounding region. The number of European and American Visas entering into the foray of the conflict is going to be the center of an alarming threat for years to come, an ISIS victory that isn't controlled and transformed into the establishment of modern nation-state, would prompt the beginning of the end for regional security across North Africa and the Middle East. The continued presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and their recent attacks in Islamabad, along with Boko Haram in Nigeria define the new threat. Our terrorist enemies are no longer murky sleeper cells occasionally hi-jacking planes and detonating explosives strapped across their chest; they are active military brigades and militias effectively waging asymmetrical military campaigns to gain territory, create Islamic pseudo states and ferment influential networks around the world.

           With mid-term elections fast approaching a more partisan president may wish to distance himself from such toxins; however, a decisive Commander and Chief would determine its time to remove the gloves in this fight, put democracy on pause and smother the flames of ISIS, the Taliban and Boko Haram in their entirety, with the ruthless and merciless military excellence known only by the elite forces of the US military. Then again, an increasingly competent transnational Sunni fighting force may be exactly what Washington, Mecca and Tel Aviv need to push back against Iranian influence, after-all Mohammed's treaty of Medina clearly provides for the peaceful co-existence with Jews; it may just be a simple matter of corraling ISIS's influence into something manageable, grooming its leadership into something capable of advancing allied regional strategic interests along the lines of Lawrence of Arabia. Such a policy would require 100% buy in from King Abdullah, Prime Minister Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and the US joint Chiefs, something unlikely to be achieved as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and ISIS is very much a devil we do not know and therefore cannot trust. Either way, its worth the risks of a mission to capture and chat. If he proves cooperative, actions would first need to be taken to change the classification of ISIS to avoid aiding and abetting a state enemy, a policy that would be widely criticized, potentially disastrous, and while worth exploring, at this juncture I would firmly council away from.

         I recommend giving the Kurds a free hand to wage operations in Mosul and the surrounding villages, for the Iraqi parliament to authorize the declaration of a state of Emergency and for an emergency council of the Arab League, US and Turkey to begin planning operations with a line of communication extended via Oman to Tehran or directly as negotiations towards the July 21^st deadline for an extension to the non-nuclear proliferation deal looms. Regional command should make US forces available and ready for clandestine action as immunity agreements are signed and authorization by POTUS cleared.

About the Author

Theo Johnson is a recent graduate from San Diego State University with a Master of Science in Homeland Security actively seeking employment as a research assistant or fellow.

Johnson.theo@gmail.com