Moving America Beyond Neoconservatism and Towards Kantian Realism (Paul Ryan, Donald Trump)

Paul Ryan, Donald Trump

Moving America Beyond Neoconservatism and Towards Kantian Realism while Winning the War on Terror and Finishing the Job in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
by Theo Johnson, Realist

Master of Science in Homeland Security, San Diego State University
Bachelor of Arts, University of California, Santa Barbara. 

  The policies promoted by Mr. Kristol and other neoconservatives have done little thus far for US interests other than stack 1.5 trillion dollars of debt on the backs of our posterity while further radicalizing and consolidating Islamic jihadist movements, while strengthening geopolitical threats presented by Iran. The Just Cause was there, the Wilsonian Legality was there, but the national interest was confused and strategic value lost because unrealistic expectations were set and lofty euro-centric objectives projected on a fundamentally divergent civilization, culture and people. 

   The Bush Administration military planners were smart to see the Islamic World as a whole, since Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda and their strategic military thinkers certainly did and do. They were also smart to maximize US gains while we had the economic and political advantage over Russia and China.  

    Barack Obama was very stupid to think you could leave Iraq without a residual force and rush a transition of responsibility for military operations in Afghanistan without losing those hard fought gains.  

   He has also failed to either respect the realities or understand the limitations of Russian power by pushing hard when he shouldn't (Syria, Crimea) and not pushing hard enough in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Putin is a constantly aggressive, highly rational actor who will not be deterred by sanctions, but will avoid escalating direct  shooting wars with the US.  

   The problem: Obama is perceived as a cupcake without any backing from the legislative houses (either democrats or republicans) or loyalty from governing departments or industries with real power. 

   From my detailed course work and reviews of pertinent matters of Military Science, it can be concluded that the Surge was the most successful act in the US-lead occupation of Iraq.  It did not make nearly as much sense to duplicate the strategy in Afghanistan; however, since there was less hope of actually making a modern nation of Afghanistan. From the standpoint of realpolitik, the viable economic revenues to underwrite nation building and then maintain any nation we build are simply not present in Afghanistan. Gas pipelines, a few billion in minerals and mining, along with poppies for pain killers can only afford a very limited government beyond the sizable security force payroll necessary to ward off the 500,000 strong new Pashtuns reaching fighting age, vulnerable to Taliban recruitment each spring.  In Afghanistan, a healthy agrarian marketplace and village level democracy is really the best you can hope for, and that is not going to be achieved by strengthening the hand of corrupt politicians in Kabul.  Our models for success in Afghanistan live in the light and lethal approach of the initial acts in Operation Enduring Freedom. 

   Iraq is a different story, the more valuable spoils of war (if prudently managed to offset costs and fund self-sustaining development for the Iraqi people) justify a maximalist approach.  With larger cities and a history of centralized government, nation building in Iraq is more feasible but best pursued by building three states from one country.  

    While initially, poor decision making by Paul Bremer in drawing a parliamentary constitutional government, disbanding the Iraqi military and De-Ba'athification of  the governing technocracy set the pre-conditions for Insurgency.  Ultimately, security concerns and the resulting low voter turn out in Anbar opened the gates for AQIs return in post-occupation Iraq, since the parliamentary model, as opposed to regional representative models (like USA, unlike England), meant that Sadyr and the Iranian aligned Shi'ite hardliners would have disproportionally high representation allowing them to block efforts to reincorporate Sunni Tribes or re-enfranchise Baathist technocrats. If democracy succeeded in Iraq and reconciliation between Sunnis/Shi'ites and Kurds prevailed, Tehran's long-term goals to move in on the power vacuum created by US departure and achieve regional hegemony across the Middle East would be undermined. And so, Ayatollah Khomeini moved his "bishop on the chess board," the radical Shi'ite militant cleric Sadyr and his loyal militias to be sure this did not happen. For short-term political gains, Malaki catered to these Shi'ite sectarian interests and so without the residual stabilizing force of 20,000 troops unanimously recommended to Barack Obama by his advisors, there was little hope of preventing what happened from happening. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi brought the Ba'athist technocrats into the governing fold Al-Qaeda in Iraq and rebranded them as the Islamic State In Syria and the Levant alluding to bloodline and deeply engraved religious narratives to claim a restoration of the Caliphate.  His vicious acumen and competent management allowed for his group to initially out perform the Iraqi government not only militarily but also as it relates to administering to the needs of the Sunnis in Anbar and the Sunni dominated provincial governates of Syria.   Had his ambitions been satisfied and he sought peace with the regions powers as a true Caliphate would, he may have avoided the hellfire and air bombardment of a wide array of regional and international forces eager to drop tonnage on incarnate evil. Al-Abadi is doing the best he can to manage sectarian forces under the name of a Unity Government. It is yet to be seen if his political skills are good enough to either save Iraq or establish a Shi'ite homeland independent from Iran and in good graces with the Nation Under God.  It is certainly the United States of America's hope and expectation that with enough of and the right type of support he can do one of these two things while assisting in the military defeat of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's vile jihadists.  

   If the United States of America and our allies had the troops on the ground to throw out the foreign Islamist jihadist fighters by force, pull the Baathist remnants away from Al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda offshoots (ISIL) and re-empower the Sunni Tribal leaders as Robert Gates lead operations successfully did during the US lead Surge and Sunni Awakening, you would have had a strong chance of creating cooperative Sunni States in exchange for increased political and economic autonomy from Damascus and Baghdad.  The US military, from what I've seen, has the morale and wherewithal to do such, but does not trust Obama (or Hillary Clinton for that matter) to be a competent Commander and Chief and is frustrated by the combination of overly restricting rules of engagement and inadequate commitments of man-power.  While the objective to destroy and degrade ISIS may be clear, the current execution of the war is strategically short-sighted and the consequence of a longer list of bad decisions made by the Bush Administration's State Department, and the post-Robert Gates as Sec. of Defense, Obama Administration.  

   With Barack Obama choosing to fight these wars by surrogate, he's strengthened terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah along with Iranian backed Shi'ite popular mobilization militias and also as a consequence the Islamic State. At this point, it may be too late but as Fallujah falls to the Iraqi Army lead forces it may be worth offering reasonable terms of surrender to Abu Bakr and IS before any final greater battles for Mosul and Raqqa commence. Essentially spare fighters and technocrats under the ISIL umbrella life and limb, in exchange for a commitment to return foreign fighters in there ranks to their countries of origin for fair trial and restore non-military baathist technocrats to their previous job positions with aforementioned political and economic autonomy at the province level in Iraq and governate level in Syria as security permits. 

    While Sunni resistance groups are at their most vulnerable, and for that matter, Shi'ite and Kurdish groups are at their most vulnerable, they will only disarm if reliable, capable, trusted and punishing guarantees are provided by outside forces. Essentially, the US should allow Russia to punish bad Arab actors with lethal force, and Russia should allow the US to use punishing lethal force against bad Shi'ite actors. By doing such an attainable peace can be secured when the "Satan incarnate, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is sent back to prison for another 1000 years," (to work within the cook-shot self-fullfiling prophesies of ISIL, Yezidis and all the rest) so that ISIL can be dismantled and disbanded as moderate provincial guards and security forces are strengthened.  

   Realistically, to enforce any such agreement there will have to be outside military forces to guarantee any terms of peace on all sides of the conflict. Iran- Shi'ites, US- Kurds, Turkey (with US, Nato and Jordanian blessings and support) guaranteeing Sunnis in Syria, Saudi/Arab League (with US support) behind-Sunnis in Iraq may work.  

   This is one of those Mexican stand offs; however, where multinationalism only complicates the matter and makes implementable resolutions near impossible. The United States of America should be the indispensable power and final arbitrator and can be if it respects the interests of each group and prioritized regional peace, stability and security as the primary national interest.

   As complicated as the conflict is, if you break it down to the basic parts as it relates to the Levant, you have 3 basic groups: Kurds, Shi'ites and Sunnis (not to overlook other minority groups, there care and protection would be a necessary component of any peace terms). Each of these groups is a majority in respective territories. The obstacle to peace then, is that these territories do not correspond with national maps as drawn by Winston Churchill.

   One can reasonable redraw national borders and give each group its own homeland and nation while balancing hostilities into peace by providing outside guarantors of this peace. The Shi''its/Sunni portions of the conflict are more predictable and manageable, especially as Russia and the US predictably back opposing sides.  

   The most challenging part of the equation is the Kurds and Turkish concerns that any Independent Kurdish homeland in former Syria/Iraq would prompt Kurdish dominated regions in the East of Turkey to also breakaway. While one leading senior intelligence authority I've spoken with have argued against any Balkanization, respectfully, I would have to formally dissent. The Balkanization of the Levant is inevitable and our concerns with theoretical command and control are preventing us from seeing the value of balancing strategies.  

   Turkey is an important ally for the US and member of NATO. It's also a valuable trading partner for Europe. With appreciation for Erdogan's help in identifying ISIL fighters returning to Europe, understanding for the woeful burden of sharing a border with Syria and promise of continued financial and technical support in dealing with the related issues, Erdogan has to understand; however, that the EU can shut them out economically and its sovereign nations could adopt strict deterrent policies as it relates to migration while the United States could simply move its NATO assets forward into any new Kurdish Republic and back into Bulgaria and Greece if Turkey's actions or inactions make such a better strategic course of action. Of course, we do not want to do this, nor do we anticipate having to do this. 

   Continued adherence to treaty and agreement, are expected to continue as cooperation and coordination tighten. Post-modern insanities of one people and what essentially amount to ~ as reformed by "Deng" China marxist-internationalism ~ bought into by the Clintons (complex interdependence as foreign policy) and promoted by Barack Obama foolishly neglect the wisdom of traditional liberalism and the idea of many peoples, each with their own homelands and sovereign nations with forums to preserve the human rights of "guests" from other nations. For the US, better to spend limited resources definitively controlling domestic immigration and supporting Visa-less travel partners to do the same as a means of mitigating the very real threat of radical Islamic violence and using nuclear options to demand submission to an orderly and well-managed administration of any agreed upon peace terms passable and enforceable by the UN Security Council.  

    Without getting into these details, Trump instinctively understands this and the underlying principles he hinted at in his "America First" speech suggest he would move away from backing non-state actors and engage in negotiations with state-to-state actors with a quid pro quo respect for absolute national sovereignty. This would pull Russia and China back into a unified Security Council and discourage unnecessary military entanglements in the future while hardening lines and opportunities for action to pre-empt nuclear proliferation to rogue regimes. Adherence to such Kantian principle, with an underlying realism in lieu of mis-guided idealism, would have prevented the disastrous Arab spring and preserved tenable and stable political norms across the Middle East and North Africa.

Realism
Foreign Policy
War on Terror
Iraq
Afghanistan
Iran
Shi'ite Militias
ISIS
ISIL
Al-Qaeda
Trump
Donald Trump
America First
Syria